The familiar Vendler-Kenny scheme of verb-types, viz., performances (further differentiated by Vedler into accomplishments and achievements), activities, and states, is too narrow in two important respects. First, it is narrow linguistically. It fails to take into account the phenomenon of verb aspect. The trichotomy is not one of verbs as lexical types but of predications. Second, the trichotomy is narrow ontologically. It is a specification in the context of human agency of the more fundamental, topic-neutral trichotomy, event-process-state.The central component in (...) this ontological trichotomy, event, can be sharply differentiated from its two flanking components by adapting a suggestion by Geoffrey N. Leech and others that the contrast between perfective and imperfective aspect in verbs corresponds to the count/mass distinction in the domain of nouns. With the help of two distinctions, of cardinal count adverbials versus frequency adverbials, and of occurrence versus associated occasion, two interrelated criteria for event predication are developed. Accordingly, Mary capsized the boat is an event predication because (a) it is equivalent to There was at least one capsizing of the boat by Mary, or (b) because it admits cardinal count adverbials, e.g., at least once, twice, three times. Ontologically speaking, events are defined as those occurrences that are inherently countable. (shrink)

ACTION, EMOTION AND WILL "This a clear and persuasive book which contains as many sharp points as a thorn bush and an array of arguments that as neat and ...

This book is a major attempt to reconcile the empirical basis of linguistic science with the a priori nature of philosophical reasoning. Its purpose is to show how the methods and findings of linguistic science, especially of transformational grammar, can be used to cast light upon central problems of analytic philosophy. After dealing with recent objections to the use of linguistic techniques in philosophy, the author shows, with great force and clarity, how these techniques can be applied to such problems (...) as the analysis of singular terms, the concepts of fact, event, and causality, and the meaning of the word "good.". (shrink)

In 1936, Benjamin Lee Whorf wrote a justly famous paper entitled "An American Indian Model of the Universe" (Carroll, 1956). In that paper, Whorf criticized the easy assumption that people in different cultures, speaking radically different languages, share common presuppositions about what the world is like. He contrasted the Hopi view of space and time with what he called elsewhere the Standard Average European view. For the Hopi, space and time are inherently relativistic; for the speaker of Western European languages, (...) like English, the universe is basically Newtonian, time and space are absolute, "containers" of things and events. (shrink)

McCawley supplements his earlier book—which covers such topics as presuppositional logic, the logic of mass terms and nonstandard quantifiers, and fuzzy ...

The paper proposes a formal account of Aristotle's trichotomy of verbs, in terms of properties of their continuous tensings, into S(state)-verbs, K(kinesis)-verbs, and E-(energeia)-verbs. Within a Fregean tense framework in which predicates are relativized to times, an account of the continuous tenses is presented and a preliminary account of the trichotomy devised, which permits an illuminating analogy to be drawn between the temporal properties of E- and K-verbs and the spatial properties of stuffs and substances. This analogy is drawn upon (...) in constructing a sophisticated version of the preliminary theory accommodating more of the linguistic data. (shrink)

In Section 1, we questioned the evidence for iteration of tenses, even with abstraction. To permit abstraction would in any case risk neutralizing our distinction between tensed and untensed sentences. Sequence of tense phenomena, far from supporting iteration, were incompatible with it. Instead, we argued, tense always retains its full deictic character; tenses never have scope over each other. The future modal WILL is exceptional (Section 2), but abstraction is not required to deal with this.An important suggestion, first made in (...) Section 1 and developed further in Section 3, would restrict quantification induced by the interpretation of Past to a domain determined by pragmatic factors. When Past serves as a reference time, e.g. when it forms part of would, as inSam believed that he would be in BostonJames bought a stamp that would be priceless then a previous occurrence of Past serves to define the domain relevant to the quantificational element of Past. Without semantic binding or reference, the two cases of Past in such sentences will thus be satisfied by the same interval in the past.The extension of this idea in Section 3, permits an account of the supposed incompleteness of the past tense without invoking a hidden THEN in e.g. I turned the lights off. In this case, restriction of the relevant domain does not proceed via an earlier occurrence of Past but depends solely on discourse factors.In Section 4, the analysis of have given in Part I is modified to introduce an element of ‘pastness’. The relevant sub-interval must be non-final-and perhaps need not even be a sub-interval of the evaluation interval itself. Empirically necessary, this change makes the incompatibility of Pres,have and a definite adverb like at 6 o'clock in a single sentence even harder to explain semantically. However, the vague restrictions on domain imposed by the present tense and relevant to the sub-interval required by an embedded have below it seem clearly pragmatically incompatible with the explicit restriction of that same interval to a very specific interval in the past — a restriction which, we argue, is imposed by a definite time adverb.Thus, Part II represents a consistent, though entirely informal plea for the embedding of the semantics of Part I in a framework in which pragmatic considerations can interact freely with the semantics, to restrict the domains within which quantification is permitted. It is in effect a plea for the introduction of partial models along the lines suggested by Barwise and Perry (1981). The advantages of the basic distinctions between tense, aspect and adverbs introduced in Part I would, we have suggested in the second part, be yet more obvious in such a framework. Formalization in a system of partial models must await further work. (shrink)

McCawley supplements his earlier book—which covers such topics as presuppositional logic, the logic of mass terms and nonstandard quantifiers, and fuzzy logic—with new material on the logic of conditional sentences, linguistic applications of type theory, Anil Gupta's work on principles of identity, and the generalized quantifier approach to the logical properties of determiners.

This book, which can be read independently, deals with more specifically linguistic problems in semantics and contains substantial original material.

In 1936, Benjamin Lee Whorf wrote a justly famous paper entitled "An American Indian Model of the Universe" (Carroll, 1956). In that paper, Whorf criticized the easy assumption that people in different cultures, speaking radically different languages, share common presuppositions about what the world is like. He contrasted the Hopi view of space and time with what he called elsewhere the Standard Average European view. For the Hopi, space and time are inherently relativistic; for the speaker of Western European languages, (...) like English, the universe is basically Newtonian, time and space are absolute, "containers" of things and events. (shrink)