Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Nonpropositional Intellectualism.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 161-195.
    Knowledge how to do things, or know-how, is intimately related to action. Yet know-how is also a genuine cognitive achievement. An adequate account must handle these points. Negatively, we advance arguments against theories that focus narrowly on abilities or propositional knowledge. Positively, we develop an alternative approach. The central idea is that know-how involves grasping a conception of a method for acting (or set of such methods)—where a method for phi-ing is a sequence of act-types the execution of which is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   106 citations  
  • Varieties of Knowledge in Plato and Aristotle.Timothy Chappell - 2012 - Topoi 31 (2):175-190.
    I develop the relatively familiar idea of a variety of forms of knowledge —not just propositional knowledge but also knowledge -how and experiential knowledge —and show how this variety can be used to make interesting sense of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy, and in particular their ethics. I then add to this threefold analysis of knowledge a less familiar fourth variety, objectual knowledge, and suggest that this is also interesting and important in the understanding of Plato and Aristotle.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Is knowledge justified true belief?John Turri - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):247-259.
    Is knowledge justified true belief? Most philosophers believe that the answer is clearly ‘no’, as demonstrated by Gettier cases. But Gettier cases don’t obviously refute the traditional view that knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). There are ways of resisting Gettier cases, at least one of which is partly successful. Nevertheless, when properly understood, Gettier cases point to a flaw in JTB, though it takes some work to appreciate just what it is. The nature of the flaw helps us better (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1886 citations  
  • An analysis of factual knowledge.Peter Unger - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (6):157-170.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   194 citations  
  • Knowing things and going places.Quill R. Kukla - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):266-282.
    When I say “I know Sarah,” or “I know Berlin,” what sort of knowledge am I claiming? Such knowledge of a particular is, I claim, not reducible to either propositional knowledge-that or to traditional physical know-how. Mere, bare knowledge by acquaintance also does not capture the kind of knowledge being claimed here. Using knowledge of a place as my central example, I argue that this kind of knowledge-of, or “objectual knowledge” as it is sometimes called, is of a distinctive epistemological (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • (3 other versions)The value of knowledge.Duncan Pritchard, J. Adam Carter & John Turri - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than knowledge, such as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Objectual Knowledge.Katalin Farkas - 2019 - In Jonathan Knowles & Thomas Raleigh (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 260-276.
    It is commonly assumed that besides knowledge of facts or truths, there is also knowledge of things–for example, we say that we know people or know places. We could call this "objectual knowledge". In this paper, I raise doubts about the idea that there is a sui generis objectual knowledge that is distinct from knowledge of truths.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Knowledge of things.Matt Duncan - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3559-3592.
    As I walk into a restaurant to meet up with a friend, I look around and see all sorts of things in my immediate environment—tables, chairs, people, colors, shapes, etc. As a result, I know of these things. But what is the nature of this knowledge? Nowadays, the standard practice among philosophers is to treat all knowledge, aside maybe from “know-how”, as propositional. But in this paper I will argue that this is a mistake. I’ll argue that some knowledge is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Epistemology Personalized.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):813-834.
    Recent epistemology has focused almost exclusively on propositional knowledge. This paper considers an underexplored area of epistemology, namely knowledge of persons: if propositional knowledge is a state of mind, consisting in a subject's attitude to a (true) proposition, the account developed here thinks of interpersonal knowledge as a state of minds, involving a subject's attitude to another (existing) subject. This kind of knowledge is distinct from propositional knowledge, but it exhibits a gradability characteristic of context-sensitivity, and admits of shifty thresholds. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • (2 other versions)A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 115.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • Aristotle.Jonathan Barnes - 1982 - In Richard Mervyn Hare, Jonathan Barnes & Henry Chadwick (eds.), Founders of thought. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   99 citations  
  • Facts: Particulars or information units?Angelika Kratzer - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):655-670.
    What are facts, situations, or events? When Situation Semantics was born in the eighties, I objected because I could not swallow the idea that situations might be chunks of information. For me, they had to be particulars like sticks or bricks. I could not imagine otherwise. The first manuscript of “An Investigation of the Lumps of Thought” that I submitted to Linguistics and Philosophy had a footnote where I distanced myself from all those who took possible situations to be units (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • Objects of knowledge and belief: Acquaintances and public figures.Jaakko Hintikka - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):869-883.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Feelings.[author unknown] - 2011
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   136 citations  
  • On the Gettier problem problem.William G. Lycan - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 148--168.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations