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  1. Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
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  • (2 other versions)Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
    To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Facing up to the problem of consciousness.D. J. Chalmers - 1996 - Toward a Science of Consciousness:5-28.
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  • (2 other versions)The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - The Monist 1:284.
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  • (2 other versions)The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (3):506-507.
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  • Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity.Thomas Metzinger (ed.) - 2003 - MIT Press.
    " In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of...
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  • The Society Of Mind.Marvin Minsky - 1986 - Simon & Schuster.
    Computing Methodologies -- Artificial Intelligence.
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  • Mental causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
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  • Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: A testable taxonomy.Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Lionel Naccache, Jérôme Sackur & Claire Sergent - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):204-211.
    Amidst the many brain events evoked by a visual stimulus, which are specifically associated with conscious perception, and which merely reflect non-conscious processing? Several recent neuroimaging studies have contrasted conscious and non-conscious visual processing, but their results appear inconsistent. Some support a correlation of conscious perception with early occipital events, others with late parieto-frontal activity. Here we attempt to make sense of those dissenting results. On the basis of a minimal neuro-computational model, the global neuronal workspace hypothesis, we propose a (...)
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  • Toward a neurobiological theory of consciousness.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 1990 - Seminars in the Neurosciences 2:263-275.
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  • Consciousness and the brain: deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts.Stanislas Dehaene - 2014 - New York, New York: Viking Press.
    A breathtaking look at the new science that can track consciousness deep in the brain How does our brain generate a conscious thought? And why does so much of our knowledge remain unconscious? Thanks to clever psychological and brain-imaging experiments, scientists are closer to cracking this mystery than ever before. In this lively book, Stanislas Dehaene describes the pioneering work his lab and the labs of other cognitive neuroscientists worldwide have accomplished in defining, testing, and explaining the brain events behind (...)
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  • Radical embodiment: Neural dynamics and consciousness.Evan Thompson & Francisco J. Varela - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (10):418-425.
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  • Downward causation.Donald T. Campbell - 1974 - In Francisco Jose Ayala & Theodosius Dobzhansky (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related Problems : [papers Presented at a Conference on Problems of Reduction in Biology Held in Villa Serbe, Bellagio, Italy 9-16 September 1972. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 179--186.
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  • The Search for Ontological Emergence.Michael Silberstein & John McGeever - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (195):201-214.
    We survey and clarify some recent appearances of the term ‘emergence’. We distinguish epistemological emergence, which is merely a limitation of descriptive apparatus, from ontological emergence, which should involve causal features of a whole system not reducible to the properties of its parts, thus implying the failure of part/whole reductionism and of mereological supervenience for that system. Are there actually any plausible cases of the latter among the numerous and various mentions of ‘emergence’ in the recent literature? Quantum mechanics seems (...)
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  • What is a complex system?James Ladyman, James Lambert & Karoline Wiesner - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):33-67.
    Complex systems research is becoming ever more important in both the natural and social sciences. It is commonly implied that there is such a thing as a complex system, different examples of which are studied across many disciplines. However, there is no concise definition of a complex system, let alone a definition on which all scientists agree. We review various attempts to characterize a complex system, and consider a core set of features that are widely associated with complex systems in (...)
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  • A modified concept of consciousness.Roger W. Sperry - 1969 - Psychological Review 76 (6):532-36.
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  • Cortical coordination dynamics and cognition.Steven L. Bressler & J. A. Scott Kelso - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):26-36.
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  • Reconciling Fechner and Stevens: Toward a unified psychophysical law.Lester E. Krueger - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (2):251-267.
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  • Individuality, subjectivity, and minimal cognition.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (6):775-796.
    The paper links discussions of two topics: biological individuality and the simplest forms of mentality. I discuss several attempts to locate the boundary between metabolic activity and ‘minimal cognition.’ I then look at differences between the kinds of individuality present in unicellular life, multicellular life in general, and animals of several kinds. Nervous systems, which are clearly relevant to cognition and subjectivity, also play an important role in the form of individuality seen in animals. The last part of the paper (...)
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  • A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.
    When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches _vehicle_ and _process_ theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space (...)
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  • Neural bases of binocular rivalry.Frank Tong, Ming Meng & Randolph Blake - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (11):502-511.
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  • (1 other version)The Society of Mind.Marvin Minsky - 1987 - The Personalist Forum 3 (1):19-32.
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  • An objective approach to subjective experience: Further explanation of a hypothesis.Roger W. Sperry - 1970 - Psychological Review 77 (6):585-590.
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  • Chaotic itinerancy as a dynamical basis of hermeneutics in brain and mind.Ichiro Tsuda - 1991 - World Futures 32 (2):167-184.
    We propose a new dynamical mechanism for information processing in mind and brain. We emphasize that a hermeneutic process is one of the key processes manifesting the functions of the brain and that it can be formulated as an itinerant motion in ultrahigh dimensional dynamical systems, which may give a new realm of the dynamic information processing. Our discussions are based on the notion of chaotic information processing and the observations of biological chaos.
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  • On emergence, agency, and organization.Stuart Kauffman & Philip Clayton - 2006 - Biology and Philosophy 21 (4):501-521.
    Ultimately we will only understand biological agency when we have developed a theory of the organization of biological processes, and science is still a long way from attaining that goal. It may be possible nonetheless to develop a list of necessary conditions for the emergence of minimal biological agency. The authors offer a model of molecular autonomous agents which meets the five minimal physical conditions that are necessary (and, we believe, conjointly sufficient) for applying agential language in biology: autocatalytic reproduction; (...)
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  • Integrated Information Theory: From Consciousness to Its Physical Substrate.Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini & Christof Koch - 2016 - Nature Reviews Neuroscience 17 (7):450--461.
    Uncovering the neural basis of consciousness is a major challenge to neuroscience. In this Perspective, Tononi and colleagues describe the integrated information theory of consciousness and how it might be used to answer outstanding questions about the nature of consciousness.
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  • Hierarchical schemas and goals in the control of sequential behavior.Richard P. Cooper & Tim Shallice - 2006 - Psychological Review 113 (4):887-916.
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  • System, Subsystem, Hive: boundary problems in computational theories of consciousness.Tomer Fekete, Cees van Leeuwen & Shimon Edelman - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7:175618.
    A computational theory of consciousness should include a quantitative measure of consciousness, or MoC, that (i) would reveal to what extent a given system is conscious, (ii) would make it possible to compare not only different systems, but also the same system at different times, and (iii) would be graded, because so is consciousness. However, unless its design is properly constrained, such an MoC gives rise to what we call the boundary problem: an MoC that labels a system as conscious (...)
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  • Self models.Thomas Metzinger - 2007 - Scholarpedia.
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  • Towards a computational theory of experience.Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):807-827.
    A standing challenge for the science of mind is to account for the datum that every mind faces in the most immediate – that is, unmediated – fashion: its phenomenal experience. The complementary tasks of explaining what it means for a system to give rise to experience and what constitutes the content of experience (qualia) in computational terms are particularly challenging, given the multiple realizability of computation. In this paper, we identify a set of conditions that a computational theory must (...)
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  • From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0.Masafumi Oizumi, Larissa Albantakis & Giulio Tononi - 2014 - PLOS Computational Biology 10 (5):e1003588.
    This paper presents Integrated Information Theory of consciousness 3.0, which incorporates several advances over previous formulations. IIT starts from phenomenological axioms: information says that each experience is specific a sh it is what it is by how it differs from alternative experiences; integration says that it is unified a sh irreducible to non-interdependent components; exclusion says that it has unique borders and a particular spatio-temporal grain. These axioms are formalized into postulates that prescribe how physical mechanisms, such as neurons or (...)
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  • A mathematical theory of strong emergence using multiscale variety.Yaneer Bar-Yam - 2004 - Complexity 9 (6):15-24.
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  • Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Michael David Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):346–353.
    Context: Neurophenomenology, as formulated by Varela, offers an approach to the science of consciousness that seeks to get beyond the hard problem of consciousness. There is much to admire in the practical approach to the science of consciousness that neurophenomenology advocates. Problem: Even so, this article argues, the metaphysical commitments of the enterprise require a firmer foundation. The root problem is that neurophenomenology, as classically formulated by Varela, endorses a form of non-reductionism that, despite its ambitions, assumes rather than dissolves (...)
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  • The Feeling of Action Tendencies: On the Emotional Regulation of Goal-Directed Behavior.Robert Lowe & Tom Ziemke - 2011 - Frontiers in Psychology 2.
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  • What needs to emerge to make you conscious?Cees van Leeuwen - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):115-136.
    Perceptual experience can be explained by contextualized brain dynamics. An inner loop of ongoing activity within the brain produces dynamic patterns of synchronization and de- synchronization that are necessary, but not sufficient, for visual experience. This inner loop is controlled by evolution, development, socialization, learning, task and perception- action contingencies, which constitute an outer loop. This outer loop is sufficient, but not necessary, for visual experience. Jointly, the inner and outer loop may offer sufficient and necessary conditions for the emergence (...)
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  • Classification of emergence and its relation to self‐organization.Julianne D. Halley & David A. Winkler - 2008 - Complexity 13 (5):10-15.
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  • Computing the Mind: How the Mind Really Works.Shimon Edelman - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    The account that Edelman gives in this book is accessible, yet unified and rigorous, and the big picture he presents is supported by evidence ranging from ...
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  • Horizontal and vertical determination of mental and neural states.Jens Harbecke & Harald Atmanspacher - 2012 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):161-179.
    Mental and neural states are related to one another by vertical interlevel relations and by horizontal intralevel relations. For particular choices of such relations, problems arise if causal efficacy is ascribed to mental states. In a series of influential papers and books, Kim has presented his much discussed “supervenience argument,” which ultimately amounts to the dilemma that mental states either are causally inefficacious or they hold the threat of overdetermining neural states. Forced by this disjunction, Kim votes in favor of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Global workspace theory of consciousness: toward a cognitive neuroscience of human experience.B. J. Baars - 2005 - Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology 150:45-53.
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  • Qualia and the Psychophysiological Explanation of Color Perception.Austen Clark - 1985 - Synthese 65 (3):377-405.
    Can psychology explain the qualitative content of experience? A persistent philosophical objection to that discipline is that it cannot. Qualitative states or 'qualia' are argued to have characteristics which cannot be explained in terms of their relationships to other psychological states, stimuli, and behavior. Since psychology is confined to descriptions of such relationships, it seems that psychology cannot explain qualia. A paradigm case of qualia is provided by simultaneous color contrast effects, in which a neutral grey patch is made to (...)
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  • Representational systems.Tomer Fekete - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (1):69-101.
    The concept of representation has been a key element in the scientific study of mental processes, ever since such studies commenced. However, usage of the term has been all but too liberal—if one were to adhere to common use it remains unclear if there are examples of physical systems which cannot be construed in terms of representation. The problem is considered afresh, taking as the starting point the notion of activity spaces—spaces of spatiotemporal events produced by dynamical systems. It is (...)
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  • Representation is representation of similarities.Shimon Edelman - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):449-467.
    Intelligent systems are faced with the problem of securing a principled (ideally, veridical) relationship between the world and its internal representation. I propose a unified approach to visual representation, addressing both the needs of superordinate and basic-level categorization and of identification of specific instances of familiar categories. According to the proposed theory, a shape is represented by its similarity to a number of reference shapes, measured in a high-dimensional space of elementary features. This amounts to embedding the stimulus in a (...)
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  • Emergence in Dynamical Systems.John Collier - 2013 - Analiza I Egzystencja 24:17-42.
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  • Being in time.Shimon Edelman & Tomer Fekete - 2012 - In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. pp. 88--81.
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  • The Phi Measure of Integrated Information is not Well-Defined for General Phsyical Systems.A. B. Barrett & P. A. M. Mediano - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):11-20.
    According to the integrated information theory of consciousness, consciousness is a fundamental observer-independent property of physical systems, and the measure Phi of integrated information is identical to the quantity or level of consciousness. For this to be plausible, there should be no alternative formulae for Phi consistent with the axioms of IIT, and there should not be cases of F being ill-defined. This article presents three ways in which Phi, in its current formulation, fails to meet these standards, and discusses (...)
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  • Mental states as macrostates emerging from brain electrical dynamics.Harald Atmanspacher - unknown
    Psychophysiological correlations form the basis for different medical and scientific disciplines, but the nature of this relation has not yet been fully understood. One conceptual option is to understand the mental as “emerging” from neural processes in the specific sense that psychology and physiology provide two different descriptions of the same system. Stating these descriptions in terms of coarser- and finer-grained system states macro- and microstates, the two descriptions may be equally adequate if the coarse-graining preserves the possibility to obtain (...)
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  • On the nature of minds, or: Truth and consequences.Shimon Edelman - 2008 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Ai 20:181-196.
    Are minds really dynamical or are they really symbolic? Because minds are bundles of computations, and because computation is always a matter of interpretation of one system by another, minds are necessarily symbolic. Because minds, along with everything else in the universe, are physical, and insofar as the laws of physics are dynamical, minds are necessarily dynamical systems. Thus, the short answer to the opening question is “yes.” It makes sense to ask further whether some of the computations that constitute (...)
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  • Functionalism, emergence, and collective coordinates: A statistical physics perspective on “what to say to a skeptical metaphysician”.Cosma Rohilla Shalizi - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):635-636.
    The positions Ross & Spurrett (R&S) take on issues of information, causality, functionalism, and emergence are actually implicit in the theory and practice of statistical physics, specifically in the way it relates macroscopic collective coordinates to microscopic physics. The reasons for taking macroscopic physical variables like temperature or magnetization to be real apply equally to mental properties like pain.
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  • Quantifying Causal Emergence Shows That Macro Can Beat Micro.Erik Hoel, Albantakis P., Tononi Larissa & Giulio - 2013 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (49):19790--19795.
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  • What is consciousness for?Lee Pierson & Monroe Trout - 2017
    What is Consciousness For? Lee Pierson and Monroe Trout Copyright © 2005 Abstract: The answer to the title question is, in a word, volition. Our hypothesis is that the ultimate adaptive function of consciousness is to make volitional movement possible. All conscious processes exist to subserve that ultimate function. Thus, we believe that all conscious organisms possess at least some volitional capability. Consciousness makes volitional attention possible; volitional attention, in turn, makes volitional movement possible. There is, as far as we (...)
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