In this paper we present an action-theoretic account of artefact using and designing and describe our ICE-theory of function ascriptions to technical artefacts. By means of this account and theory we analyse the thesis of the dual nature of technical artefacts according to which descriptions of technical artefacts draw on structural and intentional conceptualisations. We show that the ascription of technical functions to technical artefacts can connect the intentional and structural parts of descriptions of artefacts, but also separate these parts. (...) Our conclusion is that the concept of technical functions forms a ‘conceptual drawbridge’ between the intentional and structural natures of technical artefacts.Keywords: Intentional and structural descriptions; Technical artefacts; Function theory; Action theory; Use; Design. (shrink)

In this paper I evaluate the ICE-theory of function ascriptions to technical artefacts as proposed by Houkes and Vermaas, 2004a and Houkes and Vermaas, 2004b. This account adds non-structural concepts to functional description of artefacts, which are typically not employed by engineers when they ascribe functions to artefacts. The aim of this paper is to analyse to what extent the ICE-theory can reproduce the engineering view that artefacts have their functions in virtue of their physicochemical structure. It is shown that (...) this theory can reproduce this engineering view for components of artefacts but not for the artefacts themselves: engineers can ascribe functions to components on the basis of only the physicochemical structure of artefacts; but when engineers ascribe functions to artefacts as a whole, they have to consider explicitly the goals for which agents use artefacts and the actions that constitute this use.Keywords: Function theory; Technical artefacts; Components; Physics and chemistry; Engineering; Action theory. (shrink)