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The product of self-deception

Erkenntnis 67 (3):419 - 437 (2007)

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  1. 12. Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-Deception.Georges Rey - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 264-296.
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  • (1 other version)Perspectives on Self-Deception.Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.) - 1988 - University of California Press.
    00 Students of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and literature will welcome this collection of original essays on self-deception and related phenomena such as ...
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  • Paradoxes of Irrationality.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 169–187.
    The author believes that large‐scale rationality on the part of the interpretant is essential to his interpretability, and therefore, in his view, to her having a mind. How, then are cases of irrationality, such as akrasia or self‐deception, judged by the interpretant's own standards, possible? He proposes that, in order to resolve the apparent paradoxes, one must distinguish between accepting a contradictory proposition and accepting separately each of two contradictory propositions, which are held apart, which in turn requires to conceive (...)
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  • The spandrels of self-deception: Prospects for a biological theory of a mental phenomenon.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):329 – 348.
    Three puzzles about self-deception make this mental phenomenon an intriguing explanatory target. The first relates to how to define it without paradox; the second is about how to make sense of self-deception in light of the interpretive view of the mental that has become widespread in philosophy; and the third concerns why it exists at all. In this paper I address the first and third puzzles. First, I define self-deception. Second, I criticize Robert Trivers' attempt to use adaptionist evolutionary psychology (...)
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  • On the aim of belief.J. David Velleman - manuscript
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  • Practical reasoning and acceptance in a context.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):1-16.
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  • Finite rational self-deceivers.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):191 - 208.
    I raise three puzzles concerning self-deception: (i) a conceptual paradox, (ii) a dilemma about how to understand human cognitive evolution, and (iii) a tension between the fact of self-deception and Davidson’s interpretive view. I advance solutions to the first two and lay a groundwork for addressing the third. The capacity for self-deception, I argue, is a spandrel, in Gould’s and Lewontin’s sense, of other mental traits, i.e., a structural byproduct. The irony is that the mental traits of which self-deception is (...)
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  • Self-Deception Unmasked.Alfred R. Mele - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
    Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? -/- Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, (...)
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  • Reference and Reflexivity.John Perry - 2001 - Stanford, Calif.: Center for the Study of Language and Inf.
    Following his recently expanded _The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays,_ John Perry develops a reflexive-referential' account of indexicals, demonstratives and proper names. On these issues the philosophy of language in the twentieth century was shaped by two competing traditions, descriptivist and referentialist. Oddly, the classic referentialist texts of the 1970s by Kripke, Donnellan, Kaplan and others were seemingly refuted almost a century earlier by co-reference and no-reference problems raised by Russell and Frege. Perry's theory, borrowing ideas from (...)
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  • 2. Exploring the Possibility of Self-Deception in Belief.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 29-62.
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  • Who is Fooled.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Applies and extends the conclusions of the preceding chapters by examining cases of self‐deception of a puzzling sort emerging from cases of fantasizing and imagining, found in Joyce's Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and Flaubert's Madame Bovary. The author is particularly interested in what can be described as the ‘divided mind of self‐deception’, the mind that produces an imagination due to its realising the state of the world that motivates the fantasy construct and the possessor's eventual acquisition (...)
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  • Motivated irrationality.David Pears - 1984 - South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press.
    This book is about self-deception and lack of self-control or wishful thinking and acting against one's own better judgement. Steering a course between the skepticism of philosophers, who find the conscious defiance of reason too paradoxical, and the tolerant empiricism of psychologists, it compares the two kinds of irrationality, and relates the conclusions drawn to the views of Freud, cognitive psychologists, and such philosophers as Aristotle, Anscombe, Hare and Davidson.
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  • Self-deceptive belief-formation.David F. Pears - 1991 - Synthese 89 (3):393-405.
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  • Intentional self-deception in a single coherent self.W. J. Talbott - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):27-74.
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  • (1 other version)Self-deception and the nature of mind.Mark Johnston - 1994 - In Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell. pp. 63--91.
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  • Do the self-deceived get what they want?Eric Funkhouser - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.
    Two of the most basic questions regarding self-deception remain unsettled: What do self-deceivers want? What do self-deceivers get? I argue that self-deceivers are motivated by a desire to believe. However, in significant contrast with Alfred Mele’s account of self-deception, I argue that self-deceivers do not satisfy this desire. Instead, the end-state of self-deception is a false higher-order belief. This shows all self-deception to be a failure of self-knowledge.
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  • Introduction.Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 1-8.
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  • The Spandrels of Self-Deception: Prospects for a Biological Theory of a Mental Phenomenon.D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):329-348.
    Three puzzles about self-deception make this mental phenomenon an intriguing explanatory target. The first relates to how to define it without paradox; the second is about how to make sense of self-deception in light of the interpretive view of the mental that has become widespread in philosophy; and the third concerns why it exists at all. In this paper I address the first and third puzzles. First, I define self-deception. Second, I criticize Robert Trivers’ attempt to use adaptionist evolutionary psychology (...)
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  • (5 other versions)Motivated Irrationality.David Pears - 1988 - Mind 97 (387):471-478.
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  • Self-deception, motivation, and the desire to believe.Dana K. Nelkin - 2002 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):384-406.
    In this paper, I take up the question of whether the phenomenon of self-deception requires a radical sort of partitioning of the mind, and argue that it does not. Most of those who argue in favor of partitioning accept a model of self-deception according to which the self-deceived person desires to and intentionally sets out to form a certain belief that she knows to be false. Such a model is similar to that of deception of other persons, and for this (...)
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  • Self-deception, action, and will.Robert Audi - 1982 - Erkenntnis 18 (2):133-158.
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  • The myth of self-deception.Steffen Borge - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-28.
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  • (5 other versions)Motivated Irrationality.D. F. Pears & David Pugmire - 1982 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 56 (1):157-196.
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  • 4. Self-Deception, Rationalization, and Reasons for Acting.Robert Audi - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 92-120.
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  • Real Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):91-102.
    Self-deception poses tantalizing conceptual conundrums and provides fertile ground for empirical research. Recent interdisciplinary volumes on the topic feature essays by biologists, philosophers, psychiatrists, and psychologists (Lockard & Paulhus 1988, Martin 1985). Self-deception's location at the intersection of these disciplines is explained by its significance for questions of abiding interdisciplinary interest. To what extent is our mental life present--or even accessible--to consciousness? How rational are we? How is motivated irrationality to be explained? To what extent are our beliefs subject to (...)
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  • (5 other versions)Motivated Irrationality.D. F. Pears & David Pugmire - 1982 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 56 (1):157-196.
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  • Deceiving oneself or self-deceived? On the formation of beliefs under the influence.Ariela Lazar - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):265-290.
    How does a subject who is competent to detect the irrationality of a belief that p, form her belief against weighty or even conclusive evidence to the contrary? The phenomenon of self-deception threatens a widely shared view of beliefs according to which they do not regularly correspond to emotions and evaluative attitudes. Accordingly, the most popular answer to this question is that the belief formed in self-deception is caused by an intention to form that belief. On this view, the state (...)
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  • (1 other version)3. Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind.Mark Johnston - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 63-91.
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  • Reference and Reflexivity.John Perry - 2009 - Critica 41 (123):147-162.
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  • (5 other versions)Motivated Irrationality.David Pears - 1985 - Philosophy 60 (232):274-275.
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  • (5 other versions)Motivated Irrationality.David Pears - 1985 - Ethics 95 (4):943-945.
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