“It ain't nuthin' until I call it.”Bill Guthrie, UmpireNumerous criticisms of Adolf Grünbaum's account of conventions in physics have been published, and he has replied to most of them. Nonetheless, there seem to me to be good reasons for offering further criticism. In the first place Grünbaum's philosophy seems to me at least partly an extrapolation of one aspect of the views on conventions developed by Reichenbach and others. Since I think many of the issues which Reichenbach attempted to settle (...) in his various discussions of conventions in physics are genuine and important, and I also think that those aspects of his views on which Grünbaum has focused are among the least satisfactory, it seems important to suggest questions and answers about conventions in physics which may develop more satisfactory Reichenbachian themes. Secondly, Grünbaum's philosophy centers on a distinction, that between extrinsic and intrinsic properties and relations, which has never been made satisfactorily clear either by Grünbaum or by his critics. Until it is clarified we will remain unsure of just what he is claiming and why we should think it true or think it false. Finally, Grünbaum's replies to his critics, especially his most recent reply, [9], involve unusually important claims which fail to be buttressed by the arguments he gives. I have in mind such claims as that we can learn something important about the ontological status of properties and relations by examining descriptions of them, that on the most straightforward and literal interpretation, the general theory of relativity is inconsistent, and that the foremost advocates of geometrodynamics, Clifford and Wheeler, were and are enmeshed in contradiction. My own view is that all of these claims are dubious or false, but I shall be less concerned with establishing their falsity than with discrediting the arguments offered for them. (shrink)