Switch to: Citations

References in:

Continuing commentary : challenges or misunderstandings? A defence of the two-factor theory against the challenges to its logic

Chenwei Nie

Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 24 (4):300-307 (2019)

Add references

You must login to add references.

On the Distinction between Monothematic and Polythematic Delusions.Max Coltheart - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):103-112.details Some delusional patients exhibit only a single delusional belief (or several delusional beliefs concerning a single theme): this is monothematic delusion. It contrasts with polythematic delusion, where the patient exhibits a variety of delusions concerning a variety of different themes. The neuropsychological bases of various monothematic delusions are rather well understood, and there is a well-worked-out general neuropsychological theory of monothematic delusion, the two-factor theory. Whether polythematic delusion might be explained in a similar way is an open question: I sketch (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 15 citations
The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.details One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architectures but also of current research in ... Download Export citation Bookmark 480 citations
Delusional Beliefs, Two-Factor Theories, and Bizarreness.Chenwei Nie - 2016 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 11 (2):263-278.details In order to explain delusional beliefs, one must first consider what factors should be included in a theory of delusion. Unlike a one-factor theory, a two-factor theory of delusion argues that not only anomalous experience (the first factor) but also an impairment of the belief-evaluation system (the second factor) is required. Recently, two-factor theorists have adopted various Bayesian approaches in order to give a more accurate description of delusion formation. By reviewing the progression from a one-factor theory to a two-factor (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Prediction-error and two-factor theories of delusion formation: Competitors or allies?Kengo Miyazono, Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2014 - In Niall Galbraith (ed.), Aberrant Beliefs and Reasoning. Psychology Press. pp. 34-54.details The two-factor theory (Davies, Coltheart, Langdon & Breen 2001; Coltheart 2007; Coltheart, Menzies & Sutton 2010) is an influential account of delusion formation. According to the theory, there are two distinct factors that are causally responsible for delusion formation. The first factor is supposed to explain the content of the delusion, while the second factor is supposed to explain why the delusion is adopted and maintained. Recently, another remarkable account of delusion formation has been proposed, in which the notion of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
(1 other version)The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions.Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):183-216.details After reviewing factors implicated in the generation of delusional beliefs, we conclude that whilst a perceptual aberration coupled with a particular type of attri‐butional bias may be necessary to explain the specific thematic content of a bizarre delusion, neither of these factors, whether in isolation or in combination, is sufficient to explain the presence of delusional beliefs. In contrast to bias models (theories which explain delusion formation in terms of extremes of normal reasoning biases), we advocate a deficit model of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 73 citations
Cognitive neuropsychology.Max Coltheart - 2002 - In J. Wixted & H. Pashler (eds.), Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology. Wiley.details Download Export citation Bookmark 11 citations

1