Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (2 other versions)Personal Identity and the Methodology of Imaginary Cases.Daniel Cohnitz - 2003 - In Klaus Petrus (ed.), Human Persons. Ontos.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Self-consciousness in non-communicative patients.Steven Laureys, Fabien Perrin & Serge Brédart - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):722-741.
    The clinical and para-clinical examination of residual self-consciousness in non-communicative severely brain damaged patients remains exceptionally challenging. Passive presentation of the patient’s own name and own face are known to be effective attention-grabbing stimuli when clinically assessing consciousness at the patient’s bedside. Event-related potential and functional neuroimaging studies using such self-referential stimuli are currently being used to disentangle the cognitive hierarchy of self-processing. We here review neuropsychological, neuropathological, electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies using the own name and own face paradigm obtained (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of 'corporality' and 'alerting capacity'.Erik Myin - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):369-387.
    How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • (1 other version)Types of body representation and the sense of embodiment.Glenn Carruthers - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1316.
    The sense of embodiment is vital for self recognition. An examination of anosognosia for hemiplegia—the inability to recognise that one is paralysed down one side of one’s body—suggests the existence of ‘online’ and ‘offline’ representations of the body. Online representations of the body are representations of the body as it is currently, are newly constructed moment by moment and are directly “plugged into” current perception of the body. In contrast, offline representations of the body are representations of what the body (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • (1 other version)Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration of various neurocognitive views.Alain Morin - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):358-371.
    Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redundantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of self-focus, amount (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.Shaun Gallagher - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.
    Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings. Second, there is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   491 citations  
  • (1 other version)Survival and identity.David Lewis - 1976 - In Amélie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   421 citations  
  • (1 other version)Personal identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   315 citations  
  • Experience, agency, and personal identity.Marya Schechtman - 2005 - Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):1-24.
    Psychologically based accounts of personal identity over time start from a view of persons as experiencing subjects. Derek Parfit argues that if such an account is to justify the importance we attach to identity it will need to provide a deep unity of consciousness throughout the life of a person, and no such unity is possible. In response, many philosophers have switched to a view of persons as essentially agents, arguing that the importance of identity depends upon agential unity rather (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • On agency and body-ownership: Phenomenological and neurocognitive reflections.Manos Tsakiris, Simone Schütz-Bosbach & Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):645-660.
    The recent distinction between sense of agency and sense of body-ownership has attracted considerable empirical and theoretical interest. The respective contributions of central motor signals and peripheral afferent signals to these two varieties of body experience remain unknown. In the present review, we consider the methodological problems encountered in the empirical study of agency and body-ownership, and we then present a series of experiments that study the interplay between motor and sensory information. In particular, we focus on how multisensory signals (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • Having a body versus moving your body: How agency structures body-ownership.Manos Tsakiris, Gita Prabhu & Patrick Haggard - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):423-432.
    We investigated how motor agency in the voluntary control of body movement influences body awareness. In the Rubber Hand Illusion , synchronous tactile stimulation of a rubber hand and the participant’s hand leads to a feeling of the rubber hand being incorporated in the participant’s own body. One quantifiable behavioural correlate of the illusion is an induced shift in the perceived location of the participant’s hand towards the rubber hand. Previous studies showed that the induced changes in body awareness are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  • The deep bodily origins of the subjective perspective: Models and their problems.Helena De Preester - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):604-618.
    The naturalization of consciousness and the way a subjective perspective arises are hotly debated both in the cognitive sciences and in more strictly philosophical contexts. A number of these debates, mainly inspired by neuroscientific findings, focus on the ‘visceral’ dimension of the body in order to formulate a hypothesis for the coming about of consciousness. This focus on what might be called the ‘in-depth body’ shows that consciousness or the subjective perspective is intimately linked with vital and visceral regulatory processes.I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Why survival is enough.Anthony Marc Williams - 2008 - Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (4):433-449.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Bodily continuity and personal identity.B. A. O. Williams - 1960 - Analysis 21 (December):43-48.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • The self and the future.Bernard Williams - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (2):161-180.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   167 citations  
  • Narrative unity as a condition of personhood.John Christman - 2004 - Metaphilosophy 35 (5):695-713.
    In this article I critically discuss a claim made by several writers in philosophy and the social sciences that for an individual to count as a person, a single personality, or the subject of a life, the experiences of the subject in question must take a narrative form. I argue that narrativity is a misleading and, in some ways of understanding it, implausible condition of what it is that adds unity to personhood and personality. I pursue this critique by considering (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • (1 other version)More about bodily continuity and personal identity.J. M. Shorter - 1962 - Analysis 22 (March):79-85.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Le corps propre.Simone Romagnoli - 2010 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 108 (2):287-312.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity.Robert C. Coburn - 1959 - Analysis 20 (5):117 - 120.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Special issue: IV World congress of the international association of bioethics-how to get serious answers to the serious question:'How have you been?': Subjective quality of life (qol) as an.Jan L. Bernheim - 1999 - Bioethics 13 (3):272-287.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations