We use a new model of metarepresentational development to predict a cognitive deficit which could explain a crucial component of the social impairment in childhood autism. One of the manifestations of a basic metarepresentational capacity is a ‘ theory of mind ’. We have reason to believe that autistic children lack such a ‘ theory ’. If this were so, then they would be unable to impute beliefs to others and to predict their behaviour. This hypothesis was tested using Wimmer (...) and Perner’s puppet play paradigm. Normal children and those with Down’s syndrome were used as controls for a group of autistic children. Even though the mental age of the autistic children was higher than that of the controls, they alone failed to impute beliefs to others. Thus the dysfunction we have postulated and demonstrated is independent of mental retardation and specific to autism. (shrink)

Participants compared the mental capacities of various human and nonhuman characters via online surveys. Factor analysis revealed two dimensions of mind perception, Experience and Agency. The dimensions predicted different moral judgments but were both related to valuing of mind.

Humans, being highly social creatures, rely heavily on the ability to perceive what others are doing and to infer from gestures and expressions what others may be intending to do. These perceptual skills are easily mastered by most, but not all, people, in large part because human action readily communicates intentions and feelings. In recent years, remarkable advances have been made in our understanding of the visual, motoric, and affective influences on perception of human action, as well as in the (...) elucidation of the neural concomitants of perception of human action. This article reviews those advances and, where possible, draws links among those findings.Acronyms and DefinitionsApparent motion: perception of smooth motion from brief, successive exposures of static imagesChameleon effect: tendency for people to mimic the actions of others without even knowing itCommon coding principle: theory that perceiving and acting share common mental representationsDynamic noise: an array of randomly positioned dots that can camouflage perception of PL animations when the noise dots are sufficiently denseEvent-related potential : electrical brain activity registered from the scalpExtrastriate body area : brain region activated when a person views a human body or body partsFunctional magnetic resonance imaging : widely used technique that reveals brain activation patterns based on hemodynamic responses to neural activityInversion effect: difficulty of perceiving PL animations when they are shown upside downKinematics: analysis of the motions of objects without regard to the forces producing themMirror neurons: brain cells responsive when an animal engages in an activity or when it watches another animal engaged in that activityPoint-light animations: biological activity portrayed by small light tokens placed on the major body parts of an actorPositron emission tomography : brain imaging technique that uses radioactively labeled tracers to allow visualization of active brain areasSpatiotemporal jitter: means of degrading perception of PL animations, where the relative timing and positions of the moving dots are perturbedSuperior temporal sulcus : region of the cortex the posterior portion of which contains neurons selectively responsive to human activityTemplate-matching model: theory that perception of biological motion results from concatenation of static views of the bodyTranscranial magnetic stimulation : technique producing a brief disruption of neural processing. (shrink)

This essay in the "anthropology of science" is about how cognition constrains culture in producing science. The example is folk biology, whose cultural recurrence issues from the very same domain-specific cognitive universals that provide the historical backbone of systematic biology. Humans everywhere think about plants and animals in highly structured ways. People have similar folk-biological taxonomies composed of essence-based species-like groups and the ranking of species into lower- and higher-order groups. Such taxonomies are not as arbitrary in structure and content, (...) nor as variable across cultures, as the assembly of entities into cosmologies, materials or social groups. (shrink)