This essay traces the roots of corporate social responsibility in Norway. It is argued that a basic tenet of CSR, an orientation toward the concerns of stakeholders, has a long history in Norwegian business, predating the modern CSR movement. The essay underscores certain qualities of the Norwegian business system and the Norwegian political culture in order to explain how this stakeholder orientation grew and how CSR is perceived and practiced today. Corporatism and dialog are traits which position Norwegian businesses well (...) to address CSR in a globalized economy. Present-day examples of companies and practices are provided to illustrate key features of Norwegian CSR, as it has developed over the course of more than 150 years. (shrink)

We investigate what drives responsible investment of European pension funds. Pension funds are institutional investors who assure the income of part of the population for a long period of time. Increasingly, stakeholders hold pension funds accountable for the non-financial consequences of their investments and many funds have engaged in responsible investing. However, it appears that there is a wide difference between pension funds in this respect. We investigate what determines pension funds’ responsible investments on the basis of a survey of (...) more than 250 pension funds in 15 European countries in 2010. We use multinomial logistic regression and find that especially legal origin of the country, ownership of the pension fund and fund size-related variables are to be associated with pension funds′ responsible investment. For fund size, we establish a curvilinear relationship; especially the smallest and largest pension funds in the sample tend to engage with responsible investing. (shrink)

This study empirically analyses the exclusion of companies from investors’ investment universe due to a company’s business model or due to a company’s violations of international norms. We conduct a time-series analysis of the performance implications of the exclusion decisions of two leading Nordic investors, Norway’s Government Pension Fund-Global and Sweden’s AP-funds. We find that their portfolios of excluded companies do not generate an abnormal return relative to the funds’ benchmark index. While the exclusion portfolios show higher risk than the (...) respective benchmark, this difference is only statistically significant for the case of GPFG. These findings suggest that the exclusion of the companies generally does not harm funds’ performance. We interpret these findings as indicative that with exclusionary screening, as practiced by the sample funds, asset owners can meet the ethical objectives of their beneficiaries without compromising financial returns. (shrink)

In the wake of recent corporate scandals, this paper traces the growing power of pension funds to provide managerial oversight of the firms they hold in their investment portfolios. Increasingly pension funds are exercising their legitimate rights as owners to raise the corporate governance standards of the firms they invest in. Within corporate governance generally, pension funds are shifting their attention away from managerial accountability and toward measures that increase transparency in firm-level decision-making. Pension funds use transparency to ensure that (...) shareholders are the primary interest being served by the firm. Transparency not only aligns managers and owners, it also raises issues of firm behaviour that allow other stakeholders to engage the corporation more broadly. I contend that secrecy is economically inefficient. When organizations are opaque and interests are secret, decision-making can and does distort efficiency. I examine recent pension fund corporate governance campaigns with particular reference to the California Public Employees Retirement System. (shrink)