- (1 other version)Fitting Attitudes, Finkish Goods, and Value Appearances.Graham Oddie - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11.details
|
|
Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong.[author unknown] - 1977 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):581-582.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Likeness to Truth.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1989 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (1):296-297.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The autonomy of ethics.Arthur Prior - 1960 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):199–206.details
|
|
The Logic of Questions and Answers by N. D. Belnap and T. B. Steel. [REVIEW]Martin Bell - 1979 - Mind 88 (350):297-299.details
|
|
(1 other version)Hume on Is and Ought.Charles Pigden - 2011 - Philosophy Now 83:18-20.details
|
|
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Fred Feldman & J. L. Mackie - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):134.details
|
|
The Fictionalist’s Attitude Problem.Graham Oddie & Daniel Demetriou - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):485-498.details
|
|
(1 other version)A refutation of morals.John Mackie - 1946 - Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 24 (1-2):77-90.details
|
|
Likeness to Truth.Graham Oddie - 1986 - Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel.details
|
|
(1 other version)Fitting attitudes, finkish goods, and value appearances.Graham Oddie - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 74-101.details
|
|
(1 other version)Barriers to implication.Greg Restall - 2010 - In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume and ‘is’ and ‘ought’: new essays. Palgrave-Macmillan.details
|
|
Statements partly about observation.David Lewis - 1988 - Philosophical Papers 17 (1):1-31.details
|
|
Hume on Is and Ought.Charles Pigden (ed.) - 2010 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
|
|
Value, reality, and desire.Graham Oddie - 2005 - New York: Clarendon Press.details
|
|
Is it Always Fallacious to Derive Values From Facts?Mark T. Nelson - 1995 - Argumentation 9 (4):553-562.details
|
|
Minding the Is-Ought Gap.Campbell Brown - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (1):53-69.details
|
|
(1 other version)A refutation of morals.John Mackie - 1946 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1-2):77 – 90.details
|
|
The logic of questions and answers.Nuel D. Belnap & Thomas B. Steel (eds.) - 1976 - New Haven/London: Yale University Press.details
|
|
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.John Leslie Mackie - 1977 - New York: Penguin Books.details
|
|
The Foundations of Frege’s Logic.Pavel Tichý - 1988 - New York: de Gruyter.details
|
|
Constructions.Pavel Tichy - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (4):514-534.details
|
|
(1 other version)Barriers to Implication.Gillian Russell & Greg Restall - 2010 - In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The autonomy of ethics.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):199 – 206.details
|
|
Logic and the autonomy of ethics.Charles R. Pigden - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (2):127 – 151.details
|
|
Cognitivism, a priori deduction, and Moore.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Ethics 113 (3):557-575.details
|
|
The Foundations of Frege's Logic.Gregor K. Frey - 1993 - Noûs 27 (4):532-535.details
|
|
Value, judgement, and desire: Bridging the gaps.Graham Oddie - 2005 - In Value, reality, and desire. New York: Clarendon Press.details
|
|