_Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations,_ first published in 1977, comprehensively examines the general justifications for systems of private property rights, and discusses with great clarity the major arguments as to the rights and responsibilities of property ownership. In particular, the arguments that hold that there are natural rights derived from first occupancy, labour, utility, liberty and virtue are considered, as are the standard anti-property arguments based on disutility, virtue and inequality, and the belief that justice in distribution must take precedence over (...) private ownership. Lawrence Becker goes on to contend that there are four sound lines of argument for private property that, together with what is sound in the anti-property arguments, must be co-ordinated to form the foundations of a new theory. He therefore expounds a concise but sophisticated theory of property that is relevant to the modern world, and concludes by indicating some of the implications of his theory. (shrink)

This collection of essays by one of the country's leading property theorists revitalizes the liberal personality theory of property. Departing from traditional libertarian and economic theories of property, Margaret Jane Radin argues that the law should take into account nonmonetary personal value attached to property—and that some things, such as bodily integrity, are so personal they should not be considered property at all. Gathered here are pieces ranging from Radin's classic early essay on property and personhood to her recent works (...) on governmental "taking" of private property. Margaret Jane Radin is professor of law at Stanford University. She is the author of over twenty-five articles on legal and political theory. (shrink)

Embryo research, cloning, assisted conception, neonatal care, savior siblings, organ transplants, drug trials – modern developments have transformed the field of medicine almost beyond recognition in recent decades and the law struggles to keep up. At the same time legal claims against doctors and the NHS has grown and doctors feel under siege. In this highly acclaimed and very accessible book, Margaret Brazier and Emma Cave provide an incisive survey of the legal situation in areas as diverse as fertility treatment, (...) surrogacy, patient consent, euthanasia and the definition of death, malpractice and medical privacy. (shrink)

Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PIGD) goes some way to meeting the clinical, psychological and ethical problems of antenatal testing. We should guard, however, against the assumption that PIGD is the answer to all our problems. It also presents some new problems and leaves some old problems untouched. This paper will provide an overview of how PIGD meets some of the old problems but will concentrate on two new challenges for ethics (and, indeed, law). First we look at whether we should always (...) suppose that it is wrong for a clinician to implant a genetically abnormal zygote. The second concern is particularly important in the UK. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990) gives clinicians a statutory obligation to consider the interests of the future children they help to create using in vitro fertilisation (IVF) techniques. Does this mean that because PIGD is based on IVF techniques the balance of power for determining the best interests of the future child shifts from the mother to the clinician? (shrink)

The economic costs to the insurers of complementary routine genetic testing would outweigh the benefits. However, should testing technology in future be refined so as to produce a cheap and reliable test, there is no reason why insurers might not take up predictive testing as part of the normal underwriting process. It is this possibility which justifies formulating a pre-emptive policy. At the very least, there are reasons for promoting and protecting the welfare of the proposer so as to redress (...) the bargaining positions between him or her as a consumer of a service and the insurer as a commercial concern. Further considerations relate to the social purpose of insurance as a social mechanism, and the need to find ways of avoiding undermining this in light of Human Genome Project. (shrink)