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  1. (3 other versions)Personal identity.R. G. Swinburne - 1974 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:231 - 247.
    EMPIRICIST THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY STATE THAT THE IDENTITY OF A PERSON OVER TIME IS A MATTER OF BODILY CONTINUITY AND/OR SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER. IN CONTRAST, THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT WHILE BODILY CONTINUITY AND SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER ARE EVIDENCE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY, THEY DO NOT CONSTITUTE IT. IT IS SOMETHING UNDEFINABLE. THE DIFFICULTY OF KNOWING WHAT TO SAY IN PUZZLE CASES DOES NOT SHOW THAT PERSONAL IDENTITY EXISTS IN DIFFERENT DEGREES OR THAT WE HAVE TO MAKE (...)
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  • (1 other version)A compound of two substances.Eric T. Olson - 2001 - In Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul, body, and survival: essays on the metaphysics of human persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    Cartesian or substance dualism is the view that concrete substances come in two basic kinds. There are material things, such as biological organisms. These may be either simple or composed of parts. And there are immaterial things--minds or souls--which are always simple. No material thing depends for its existence on any soul, or vice versa. And only souls can think.
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  • (1 other version)A Compound of Two Substances.Eric T. Olson - 2001 - In Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul, body, and survival: essays on the metaphysics of human persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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  • The Argument to the Soul from Partial Brain Transplants.Richard Swinburne - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (1):13-19.
    Suppose we transplant the left hemisphere of one person, Alexandra, into the skull of another person, Alex, from whom both cerebral hemispheres have been removed; and transplant Alexandra’s right hemisphere into the skull of another person, Sandra, both of whose cerebral hemispheres have been removed. Both of the resulting persons will then have some of Alexandra’s brain and probably almost all of her memories and character. But since at most only one of them can be Alexandra, being Alexandra must, by (...)
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