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  1. Features of similarity.Amos Tversky - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (4):327-352.
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  • Probability, Frequency, and Reasonable Expectation.Richard Threlkeld Cox - 1946 - American Journal of Physics 14 (2):1-13.
    Probability, Frequency and Reasonable Expectation.
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  • An Overview of KRL, a Knowledge Representation Language.Daniel G. Bobrow & Terry Winograd - 1977 - Cognitive Science 1 (1):3-46.
    This paper describes KRL, a Knowledge Representation Language designed for use in understander systems. It outlines both the general concepts which underlie our research and the details of KRL‐0, an experimental implementation of some of these concepts. KRL is an attempt to integrate procedural knowledge with a broad base of declarative forms. These forms provide a variety of ways to express the logical structure of the knowledge, in order to give flexibility in associating procedures (for memory and reasoning) with specific (...)
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  • Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.
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  • Categorical and probabilistic reasoning in medical diagnosis.Peter Szolovits & Stephen G. Pauker - 1978 - Artificial Intelligence 11 (1-2):115-144.
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  • Constructive probability.Glenn Shafer - 1981 - Synthese 48 (1):1-60.
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  • Fusion, propagation, and structuring in belief networks.Judea Pearl - 1986 - Artificial Intelligence 29 (3):241-288.
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  • Default Probability.Daniel N. Osherson, Joshua Stern, Ormond Wilkie, Michael Stob & Edward E. Smith - 1991 - Cognitive Science 15 (2):251-269.
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  • Extrapolating human probability judgment.Daniel Osherson, Edward E. Smith, Tracy S. Myers, Eldar Shafir & Michael Stob - 1994 - Theory and Decision 36 (2):103-129.
    We advance a model of human probability judgment and apply it to the design of an extrapolation algorithm. Such an algorithm examines a person's judgment about the likelihood of various statements and is then able to predict the same person's judgments about new statements. The algorithm is tested against judgments produced by thirty undergraduates asked to assign probabilities to statements about mammals.
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  • A Source of Bayesian Priors.Daniel Osherson, Edward E. Smith, Eldar Shafir, Antoine Gualtierotti & Kevin Biolsi - 1995 - Cognitive Science 19 (3):377-405.
    Establishing reasonable, prior distributions remains a significant obstacle for the construction of probabilistic expert systems. Human assessment of chance is often relied upon for this purpose, but this has the drawback of being inconsistent with axioms of probability. This article advances a method for extracting a coherent distribution of probability from human judgment. The method is based on a psychological model of probabilistic reasoning, followed by a correction phase using linear programming.
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  • Probabilities over rich languages, testing and randomness.Haim Gaifman & Marc Snir - 1982 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (3):495-548.
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  • La Prévision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives.Bruno de Finetti - 1937 - Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré 7 (1):1-68.
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  • A Framework for Representing Knowledge.Marvin Minsky - unknown
    It seems to me that the ingredients of most theories both in Artificial Intelligence and in Psychology have been on the whole too minute, local, and unstructured to account–either practically or phenomenologically–for the effectiveness of common-sense thought. The "chunks" of reasoning, language, memory, and "perception" ought to be larger and more structured; their factual and procedural contents must be more intimately connected in order to explain the apparent power and speed of mental activities.
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