The rapidly increasing numbers of elderly people in our society have raised some important moral questions: How should we distribute social resources among different age groups? What does justice require from both the young and the old? In this book, Norman Daniels offers the first systematic philosophical discussion of these urgent questions, advocating what he calls a "lifespan" approach to the problem: Since, as they age, people pass through a variety of institutions, the challenge of caring for the elderly becomes (...) the prudent allocation of public resources among the various stages of people's lives. Using this philosophical approach, Daniels addresses specific public policy issues such as the allocation of medical funds, the adequacy of long-term care, current Medicare cost-containment measures, and the equitable distribution of income support over the lifespan and between generations. (shrink)

Does morality require the filial obligation of grown children toward their aged parents? First, problems with some accounts of filial morality that have been put forth in recent years in the West are examined (Jane English, Jeffrey Blustein, and others), and then it is shown how Confucianism provides a sensible alternative perspective.

Västvärldens åldrande befolkning anses ofta ställa krav på nya former av vård och omsorg. Olika typer av informations- och kommunikationstekniskt baserat vårdstöd framhålls ofta som en lösning. Tekniken medger en rad olika fördelar, exempelvis tätare tillsyn, kontinuerliga mätningar av vitala funktioner, med möjlighet att kontinuerligt ställa diagnos, och snabb respons på larm, men de tekniska lösningarna får också etiska implikationer. I den här artikeln beskrivs och exemplifieras IKT-baserad vård och omsorg och teknikens påverkan på centrala värden som personlig integritet, autonomi, (...) frivillighet och informerat samtycke diskuteras. Interaktiv etisk teknikvärdering föreslås för att bättre inkorporera alla berörda parters behov av och synpunkter på den här typen av vårdstöd.Nyckelord: autonomi, etik, frivillighet, informerat samtycke, interaktiv etisk teknikvärdering, IKT-baserat vårdstöd, hemvård, personlig integritet, robotteknik, sensorteknik, säkerhet, trygghet, valfrihetEnglish summary: When health care moves in – the ethics of mobile health careAn ageing population in the Western world is typically taken to require novel forms of health care. Different types of Information and Communication based services and functions are presented as a solution. Even if such technology imply benefits in terms of more frequent attendance, continuous monitoring and diagnoses of vital signs and quick response to alarms, the technology also gives raise to ethical concerns. This article describes and exemplifies ICT-based health care and discusses implications on central values like privacy, autonomy, freedom of choice and informed consent. Interactive ethical technology assessment is suggested as a means to better incorporate the needs of all concerned parties and their perspectives on this type of support. (shrink)

A continuing need for care for elderly, combined with looser family structures prompt the question what filial obligations are. Do adult children of elderly have a duty to care? Several theories of filial obligation are reviewed. The reciprocity argument is not sensitive to the parent–child relationship after childhood. A theory of friendship does not offer a correct parallel for the relationship between adult child and elderly parent. Arguments based on need or vulnerability run the risk of being unjust to those (...) on whom a needs-based claim is laid. To compare filial obligations with promises makes too much of parents’ expectations, however reasonable they may be. The good of being in an unchosen relationship seems the best basis for filial obligations, with an according duty to maintain the relationship when possible. We suggest this relationship should be maintained even if one of the parties is no longer capable of consciously contributing to it. We argue that this entails a duty to care about one’s parents, not for one’s parents. This implies that care for the elderly is not in the first place a task for adult children. (shrink)

A continuing need for care for elderly, combined with looser family structures prompt the question what filial obligations are. Do adult children of elderly have a duty to care? Several theories of filial obligation are reviewed. The reciprocity argument is not sensitive to the parent–child relationship after childhood. A theory of friendship does not offer a correct parallel for the relationship between adult child and elderly parent. Arguments based on need or vulnerability run the risk of being unjust to those (...) on whom a needs-based claim is laid. To compare filial obligations with promises makes too much of parents’ expectations, however reasonable they may be. The good of being in an unchosen relationship seems the best basis for filial obligations, with an according duty to maintain the relationship when possible. We suggest this relationship should be maintained even if one of the parties is no longer capable of consciously contributing to it. We argue that this entails a duty to care about one’s parents, not for one’s parents. This implies that care for the elderly is not in the first place a task for adult children. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate the web-rhetoric of companies offering home-based personal health monitoring to patients and elderly people. Two main rhetorical methods are found, namely a reference to practical benefits and a use of prestige words like “quality of life” and “independence”. I interpret the practical benefits in terms of instrumental values and the prestige words in terms of final values. I also reconstruct the arguments on the websites in terms of six different types of argument. Finally, I articulate (...) a general critique of the arguments, namely that the websites neglect the context of use of personal health monitoring technologies. Whether or not a technology is good depends on the use of the technology by a particular individual in a particular context. The technology is not good–or bad–in itself. I support this critique with a number of more specific arguments such as the risk for reduced personal contact. For some elderly people social contact with care providers is more valuable than the independent living made possible by remote monitoring, for others independence is more important. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Protecting The Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities. By Robert E. Goodin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.