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∗ Apologies to Mark Hinchliff for stealing the title of his dissertation. (See Hinchliff, A Defense of Presentism. As it turns out, however, the version of Presentism defended here is different from the version defended by Hinchliff. See Section 3.1 below.). |
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In this paper I argue that presentism has a problem accounting forthe truth of statements whose truth conditions seem to require therebe relations that hold between present and non-present objects. Imotivate the problem and then examine several strategies for dealingwith the problem. I argue that no solution is forthcoming, and thispresents a prima facie problem for presentism. |
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In this paper I consider the aboutness objection against standard truth-preserving presentism (STP). According to STP: (1) past-directed propositions (propositions that seem to be about the past) like , are sometimes true (2) truth supervenes on being and (3) the truth of past-directed propositions does not supervene on how things were, in the past. According to the aboutness objection (3) is implausible, given (1) and (2): for any proposition, P, P ought to be true in virtue of what P is (...) |
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Dynamic events such as a rolling ball moving from one place to another involve change and time intervals and thus presumably successions of static events occurring one after the other, e.g., the ball’s being at a certain place and then at another place during the interval in question. When dynamic events are experienced they should count as present and thus as existent from a presentist point of view. But this seems to imply the existence of the static events involved in (...) |
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This paper defends three theses: that presentism is either trivial or untenable; that the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time is not about the status of presentism; and that there is no temporal analogue of the modal thesis of actualism. |
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Actualism is the thesis that necessarily, everything that there is exists. Serious actualism is the thesis that necessarily, no object has a property in a world in which it does not exist. Let's call the claim that actualism entails serious actualism the Entailment Thesis (ET). In this paper I will improve upon a previous argument of mine for (ET). I will then consider the prospects for defending a similar thesis in the temporal realm—the thesis that presentism entails serious presentism. |
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This chapter discusses the obstacles faced by presentists after denying the existence of past and future individuals. Presentism must still account for the manifest facts about the past and the future, but problems may arise when the presentist attempts to provide an account of the past. There is nothing in the presentist’s ontology on which to base truths about the past. Also, there is a problem regarding singular truths about past individuals; if past individuals do not exist, then they do (...) |
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Typical presentism asserts that whatever exists is present. Moderate presentism more modestly claims that all events are present and thus acknowledges past and future times understood in a substantivalist sense, and past objects understood, following Williamson, as “ex-concrete.” It is argued that moderate presentism retains the most valuable features of typical presentism, while having considerable advantages in dealing with its most prominent difficulties. |
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