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Predicting weather and climate: Uncertainty, ensembles and probability

Wendy S. Parker

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (3):263-272 (2010)

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Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow.Edward Lorenz - 1963 - Journal of Atmospheric Sciences 20 (2):130-148.details Finite systems of deterministic ordinary nonlinear differential equations may be designed to represent forced dissipative hydrodynamic flow. Solutions of these equations can be identified with trajectories in phase space. For those systems with bounded solutions, it is found that nonperiodic solutions are ordinarily unstable with respect to small modifications, so that slightly differing initial states can evolve into considerably different states. Systems with bounded solutions are shown to possess bounded numerical solutions.A simple system representing cellular convection is solved numerically. All (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 131 citations
A material theory of induction.John D. Norton - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.details Contrary to formal theories of induction, I argue that there are no universal inductive inference schemas. The inductive inferences of science are grounded in matters of fact that hold only in particular domains, so that all inductive inference is local. Some are so localized as to defy familiar characterization. Since inductive inference schemas are underwritten by facts, we can assess and control the inductive risk taken in an induction by investigating the warrant for its underwriting facts. In learning more facts, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 187 citations
The reference class problem is your problem too.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):563--585.details The reference class problem arises when we want to assign a probability to a proposition (or sentence, or event) X, which may be classified in various ways, yet its probability can change depending on how it is classified. The problem is usually regarded as one specifically for the frequentist interpretation of probability and is often considered fatal to it. I argue that versions of the classical, logical, propensity and subjectivist interpretations also fall prey to their own variants of the reference (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 112 citations

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