One of the central debates within contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy concerns how to formulate an egalitarian theory of distributive justice which gives coherent expression to egalitarian convictions and withstands the most powerful anti-egalitarian objections. This book brings together many of the key contributions to that debate by some of the world’s leading political philosophers: Richard Arneson, G.A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, John Rawls, T.M. Scanlon, and Larry Temkin.

This article objects to two major economistic shortcomings of Philippe Van Parijs’s Real Freedom for All: (1) Van Parijs claims that market prices are the best metric for equal real freedom. This is challenged. Market prices admittedly are the best instrument for distributive purposes at hand. They are, however, a means of transport for supply and demand contingendes. Hence market prices are to be considered as an insufficient metric for equal freedom. (2) Van Parijs claims that Real Freedom for All (...) is all there is to social justice. This claim is rejected. Despite its demanding egalitarian ambition, Real Freedom for All fails to protect a flourishing human life. Basic human rights like the right to social recognition and, in part, the right to health care are violated. Curiously even the right to autonomy is in want of full protection. These lacks are caused by the monetarism and the Straightforward market optimism of Real Freedom for All. (shrink)

Philippe Van Parijs’s ethical justification of basic income is based on the argument that job resources must be shared equally. Underlying this idea are two important claims: (1) all individuals in society hold an ex. ante entitlement in job resources and (2) job resources are tradable: First, I present the real-libertarian argument for sharing job resources. Next, I identify and critically review three different objections against this view: the liability objection, the cooperation objection and the parasitism objection. I believe the (...) parasitism objection poses a serious challenge to basic income, and argue that Van Parijs’s most plausible response-based on the idea that job resources are socially owned-is flawed. I provide the outline of an alternative normative basis for grounding a person's ex ante entitlement to job resources using an institutionalist approach. (shrink)

I agree with Van Parijs that a theory of justice must meet the condition of indicating institutions that eliminate compulsory unemployment, but argue that his basic income is another form of unemployment compensation with all the disadvantages such compensations suffer from. In particular, it does not advance real freedom, but is liable to contribute to narrow political ends. I indicate an alternative and explicate, since Van Parijs disregards it, the right to work and its basis in the common property of (...) natural resources. Finally, I compare the two competing conceptions of a good life that underlie his recommendation of a basic income and my rejection of it. (shrink)