According to what I will call a contextualist solution to the sorites paradox, vague terms are context-sensitive, and one can give a convincing dissolution of the sorites paradox in terms of this context-dependency. The reason, according to the contextualist, that precise boundaries for expressions like “heap” or “tall for a basketball player” are so difficult to detect is that when two entities are sufficiently similar (or saliently similar), we tend to shift the interpretation of the vague expression so that if (...) one counts as falling in the extension of the property expressed by that expression, so does the other. As a consequence, when we look for the boundary of the extension of a vague expression in its penumbra, our very looking has the effect of changing the interpretation of the vague expression so that the boundary is not where we are looking. This accounts for the persuasive force of sorites arguments. (shrink)

His first point is that true exhibits pathologies that smidget doesn’t. If smidget is undefined for Charlie, then the sentence Charlie is a smidget is undefined, and there is no basis for accepting either it or its negation. There is no pathology here; it is simply a case in which a sentence and its negation must both be rejected. With smidget there is no paradoxicality analogous to Liar sentences and no circularity corresponding to Truth Tellers. Gupta concludes that true and (...) smidget must be very different. (shrink)