ALTHOUGH THE IDEA OF A VIOLATION OF NATURAL LAW IS NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVED IN THE IDEA OF THE MIRACULOUS, THERE IS "ONE KIND" OF MIRACLE WHICH SEEMS TO INVOLVE IT. HUME’S DISCUSSION OF THE EVIDENCE FOR MIRACLES RELATES TO THIS KIND AND IS INTERPRETABLE AS AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS POSSIBILITY. ALSO THERE IS AN ARGUMENT THAT THE EXPRESSION "VIOLATION OF NATURAL LAW" SIGNIFIES A CONFUSION IN WHICH THE IDEAS OF NATURAL LAW AND LEGAL LAW COLLAPSE INTO EACH OTHER. NEITHER OF (...) THESE ARGUMENTS IS EFFICACIOUS. FURTHERMORE, THE CONTENTION THAT THERE CAN BE NO SUCH THING AS ESTABLISHING THE "ABSENCE" OF A NATURAL CAUSE IS OPEN TO OBJECTION. HOWEVER, TO BE CONCEIVED AS A VIOLATION OF NATURAL LAW, A MIRACLE MUST BE THOUGHT OF AS AN OCCURRENCE WHICH IS BOTH EMPIRICALLY CERTAIN AND CONCEPTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE--WHICH OUGHT TO MAKE THE NOTION RIDICULOUS. AND YET IT NEED NOT. (shrink)

The status of religion in the modern world is intimately related to the rise of science. The clearest way of getting at this relation is to consider the issue of miracle. Given the success of scientists in predicting and controlling natural phenomena, many of the leading theologians of the modern era abandoned the understanding of miracle as a supernatural violation of natural regularities. They conceded the capacity of scientists to offer natural explanations of phenomena that are naturally observable and shifted (...) their theological focus from the observable patterns of nature to morality, religious experience, and history. Although many liberal and existentialistic theologians affirmed the miraculous, especially with regard to the Resurrection, they avoided a head on collision with science. (shrink)

Suppose Jones sees a mountain in the distance and says to the mountain, ‘Mountain, cast yourself into the sea!’, whereupon the mountain is observed to rise up from its surroundings and fall into the water. If such a phenomenon occurred, why should we say that Jones moved the mountain, rather than that Jones addressed the mountain in a certain way and that by a strange coincidence the mountain happened to move an instant later and fall into the water?

Professor Roland Puccetti sets himself a double aim in his article ‘The Loving God—Some Observations on John Hick's Evil and the Love of God ’ . His more modest aim is to demolish the Irenaean type of Christian theodicy presented in the book which he discusses. His more ambitious aim is to show that no theodicy of any kind is possible because ‘theodicy in general is a subject without a proper object’ . His intention is thus ‘not only to carry (...) the battle but also the campaign’ ; and at the end he is evidently satisfied that he has done this. But I think it can be shown that his satisfaction is at least premature. He has not achieved even his more limited aim, still less his more comprehensive one. For in his critique he altogether omits from consideration an essential part of the argument which he is attacking. Whereas in the first ten sections of his articlehe gives accurate summaries of the relevant aspects of the view which he is criticising, in section eleven on the ‘appeal to mystery’ his summary is misleadingly inadequate. He simply ignores a crucial aspect of the theodicy he is trying to demolish; and the purpose of the present article is to repair that omission. (shrink)

The writing of yet another paper on miracles probably stands in need of justification. The justification I wish to claim has two aspects. Firstly, I think that the concepts of the miraculous usually defended and, in turn, criticized, are unacceptable and that a better one is available. Secondly, and more importantly, I think that these unacceptable concepts produce in virtue of their inherent weaknesses a situation in which only the less important questions get asked about miracles. These questions are those (...) which relate to the ontological status of miracles. I think it can be shown that is is the epistemological questions about miracles which are more interesting and important and, furthermore, that the standard accounts are so hemmed in by the difficulties raised for them that a preoccupation with ontological questions characterizes most discussion. (shrink)

IT IS ARGUED THAT THE CENTRAL PROBLEM ABOUT MIRACLES IS NOT WHETHER SCIENTIFIC REGULARITIES CAN BE VIOLATED, BUT WHETHER SUCH VIOLATIONS COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO AGENTS. FOR A PHENOMENON TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO RATIONAL AGENCY, REPETITION BY THE AGENT MUST IN PRINCIPLE BE POSSIBLE: BUT IF REPETITION IS POSSIBLE, THE PHENOMENON CAN BE SUBSUMED UNDER SOME SCIENTIFIC REGULARITY. THE BELIEVER IN MIRACLES WISHES TO CLAIM THAT MIRACLES ARE BOTH CAUSED (BY AN AGENT) AND UNCAUSED (BY VIOLATING SCIENTIFIC REGULARITY); BUT THESE (...) CLAIMS ARE MUTUALLY INCOMPATIBLE. (shrink)

THIS PAPER DISTINGUISHES TWO MAIN SUPERNATURALIST SENSES OF ’MIRACLE’ AND FOUR CORRESPONDING SENSES OF ’PARADOX,’ ALL OF WHICH ARE SHOWN TO INVOLVE THE NOTION OF A DISCREPANT OR INCOHERENT FACT. IT REJECTS THIS NOTION AS A CONTRADICTION IN USE AND ARGUES THAT NONE OF THE TRADITIONAL SENSES OF THESE TERMS CAN CONSISTENTLY NAME OR DESCRIBE ANY REAL OR ALLEGED EVENT.

1. HUME’S ARGUMENT, FLEW CORRECTLY EXPLAINS, IS NOT THAT MIRACLES CANNOT HAPPEN, BUT THAT THERE MUST BE A CONFLICT IN THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THEY DO. 2. (I) FLEW FURTHER APPEALS TO THE INHERENT WEAKNESS OF HISTORICAL AS OPPOSED TO SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE. BUT ONE’S ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE MUST DEPEND ON WHETHER THE CONCEPT IS POSSIBLE. (II) FLEW CLAIMS THAT HUME CAN BE TAKEN TO MEAN THAT WHAT IS ALLOWED TO BE A LOGICAL POSSIBILITY SHOULD YET BE DISMISSED AS (...) IMPOSSIBLE IN FACT. BUT THIS DISTINCTION CANNOT BE APPLIED IN ADVANCE OF AN OCCURRENCE, WITHOUT BEGGING THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER IT IS INDEED POSSIBLE OR NOT. 3. PACE HUME AND FLEW, ENTERTAINING THE CONCEPT IS NOT INCOHERENT. FOR (I) THE RELEVANT "LAW OF NATURE" CAN BE THOUGHT OF AS POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE, THOUGH NOT IN FACT SO; (II) ONE MAY CONCEIVE OF AN "UNCAUSED" EVENT, ONCE ONE SUPPOSES THAT IN MOST OTHER CASES THE UNIVERSE IS UNIFORM. THUS IT COULD BE RATIONAL TO JUDGE THAT A MIRACLE HAD OCCURRED, SINCE THIS WOULD NOT CAL. (shrink)

MY PAPER EXAMINES THE ’VIOLATION’ CONCEPT OF THE MIRACULOUS, INVOLVING THE OCCURRENCE OF AN EVENT RULED OUT BY A LAW OF NATURE. ANY BELIEF IN THE OCCURRENCE OF SUCH AN EVENT IS IRRATIONAL, IN THE SENSE IN WHICH IT WOULD BE IRRATIONAL FOR YOU TO BELIEVE AT THIS MOMENT THAT YOU WERE NOT READING THIS ABSTRACT BUT WERE HALLUCINATING. TO SHOW THAT IT IS NOT ALWAYS IRRATIONAL TO BELIEVE IN MIRACLES, ONE MUST ASSERT THAT TO KNOW WITH CERTAINTY THAT AN (...) EVENT IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE, IS NOT TO KNOW WITH CERTAINTY THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE, ON GROUNDS THAT ITS OCCURRENCE DOES NOT INVOLVE A SELF-CONTRADICTION. BUT SUCH A PREMISE LEADS TO A FORM OF GENERAL SKEPTICISM WHICH WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE EVER TO ESTABLISH THAT ANY EVENT HAD OCCURRED. (shrink)