- (1 other version)Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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The Metaphysics of Truth.Douglas Edwards - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Peer Disagreement.Filippo Ferrari & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2019 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge.details
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Normative Alethic Pluralism.Filippo Ferrari - 2018 - In Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Cham, Switzerland and Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 145-168.details
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Three Ways in Which Logic Might Be Normative.Florian Steinberger - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (1):5-31.details
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Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):883-890.details
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Logical pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.details
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Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Edited by Greg Restall.details
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Truth as One and Many * By Michael Lynch. [REVIEW]Michael Lynch - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):191-193.details
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Pluralism × 3: Truth, Logic, Metaphysics.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S2):259-277.details
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Recent work on alethic pluralism.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):588-607.details
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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The normative status of logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Three questions for truth pluralism.Michael P. Lynch - 2012 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 21.details
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A plurality of pluralisms.Crispin Wright - 2012 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 123.details
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Truth pluralism and many-valued logics: A reply to Beall.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):382-385.details
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Logic and the Laws of Thought.Jessica Leech - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.details
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(1 other version)Truth as one and many.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - New York : Clarendon Press,: Clarendon Press.details
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Lectures on logic.Immanuel Kant (ed.) - 1992 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Mixed inferences: A problem for pluralism about truth predicates.Christine Tappolet - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):209–210.details
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Logic for Alethic Pluralists.Andy Demfree Yu - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (6):277–302.details
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A Functionalist Theory of Truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2001 - In The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. pp. 723--750.details
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Truth and multiple realizability.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.details
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(1 other version)Review of Gilbert Harman: Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. [REVIEW]Howard Margolis - 1986 - Ethics 99 (4):966-966.details
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Disagreement about Taste and Alethic Suberogation.Filippo Ferrari - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):516-535.details
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Truth as One(s) and Many: On Lynch's Alethic Functionalism.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Douglas Edwards - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (3):213-230.details
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Stabilizing alethic pluralism.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):92-108.details
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True Alethic Functionalism?Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):125-133.details
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