I reject the contention that an important theoretical difference exists between formal and natural languages.

This is a criticism of quine's treatment of mass terms such as "water", "gold", Etc. In word and object. Instead of becoming singular terms referring to a "scattered object", It is argued that they either become general terms as subjects of sentences or retain their unique status as ascribed to an indicated place.

The views of Quine and Strawson on the significance of 'mass terms' are rehearsed, and the metaphysical status of substances, in the chemist's sense, is considered. It is urged that the ontological dichotomy of particulars and universals is not adequate to accommodate such substances, which are in a sense to be explicated concrete but non-particular.

Methods of representing sentences containing mass terms (e.g. "gold") and amount terms (e.g. "three gallons") within the predicate calculus are given, and the semantics of the resulting sentences is discussed. the appendix sketches a way to systematically translate english sentences into the logical notation, exploiting some results of transformational grammar.