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Switch to: Citations
References in:
A Model of Minimal Probabilistic Belief Revision
Theory and Decision 67 (2):163-222 (2009)
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Classic analysis of the subject and the development of personal probability; one of the greatest controversies in modern statistcal thought. |
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A study in the logic of theory change, examining the properties of maxichoice contraction and revision operations. |
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A vast and interesting family of natural semantics for belief revision is defined. Suppose one is given a distance d between any two models. One may then define the revision of a theory K by a formula α as the theory defined by the set of all those models of α that are closest, by d, to the set of models of K. This family is characterized by a set of rationality postulates that extends the AGM postulates. The new postulates (...) |
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