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  1. Recent work on moral responsibility.John Fischer - 1999 - Ethics 110 (1):93–139.
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  • Libertarianism and Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities.David Widerker - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.
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  • Incompatibilism and the avoidability of blame.Michael Otsuka - 1998 - Ethics 108 (4):685-701.
    I defend an incompatibilist 'Principle of Avoidable Blame' according to which one is blameworthy for performing an act of a given type only if one could instead have behaved in a manner for which one would have been blameless. First, I demonstrate that this principle is resistant to Harry Frankfurt-type counterexample. Second, I present a positive argument for this principle that appeals to the relation of blame to the 'reactive attitude' of indignation. Finally, I argue against the possibility of blamelessly (...)
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  • Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases.Alfred R. Mele & David Robb - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):97-112.
    Almost thirty years ago, in an attempt to undermine what he termed "the principle of alternate possibilities" (the thesis that people are morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise), Harry Frankfurt offered an ingenious thought-experiment that has played a major role in subsequent work on moral responsibility and free will. Several philosophers, including David Widerker and Robert Kane, argued recently that this thought-experiment and others like it are fundamentally flawed. This paper develops a (...)
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  • Stumping For Widerker.Stewart Goetz - 1999 - Faith and Philosophy 16 (1):83-89.
    David Widerker has forcefully argued that a libertarian is on firm ground in believing that the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) is true. Eleonore Stump has argued that not all libertarians need accept PAP, and that its acceptance is not required for a rejection of compatibilism.This paper is a defense of Widerker against Stump. I argue that it is not at all clear that Stump’s view of freedom is libertarian in nature, and that she has not provided a good reason (...)
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  • Moral Responsibility and Leeway for Action.Keith Wyma - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):57 - 70.
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  • Libertarian freedom and the principle of alternative possibilities.Eleonore Stump - 1996 - In Jeff Jordan & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield. pp. 73-88.
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  • Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases.Alfred R. Mele and David Robb - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):97-112.
    Almost thirty years ago, in an attempt to undermine what he termed “the principle of alternate possibilities”.
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