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A philosophical outlook on potential conflicts between planetary protection, astrobiology and commercial use of space

In Zoe Lehmann-Imfeld & Andreas Losch, Our Common Cosmos: Exploring the Future of Theology, Human Culture and Space Sciences. Bloomsbury. pp. 141-160 (2019)

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  1. The Varieties of Intrinsic Value.John O’Neill - 1992 - The Monist 75 (2):119-137.
    To hold an environmental ethic is to hold that non-human beings and states of affairs in the natural world have intrinsic value. This seemingly straightforward claim has been the focus of much recent philosophical discussion of environmental issues. Its clarity is, however, illusory. The term ‘intrinsic value’ has a variety of senses and many arguments on environmental ethics suffer from a conflation of these different senses: specimen hunters for the fallacy of equivocation will find rich pickings in the area. This (...)
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  • On being morally considerable.Kenneth E. Goodpaster - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (6):308-325.
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  • Not for Humans Only. The Place of Nonhumans in Environmental Ethics.P. Singer - forthcoming - Environmental Ethics. An Anthology.
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  • Felt evaluations: A theory of pleasure and pain.Bennett W. Helm - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):13-30.
    This paper argues that pleasure and pains are not qualia and they are not to be analyzed in terms of supposedly antecedently intelligible mental states like bodily sensation or desire. Rather, pleasure and pain are char- acteristic of a distinctive kind of evaluation that is common to emotions, desires, and (some) bodily sensations. These are felt evaluations: pas- sive responses to attend to and be motivated by the import of something impressing itself on us, responses that are nonetheless simultaneously con- (...)
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  • (1 other version)The conceptual foundations of the land ethic.J. Baird Callicott - 2010 - In Craig Hanks, Technology and values: essential readings. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
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  • Animal Liberation is an Environmental Ethic.Dale Jamieson - 1998 - Environmental Values 7 (1):41-57.
    I begin by briefly tracing the history of the split between environmental ethics and animal liberation, go on to sketch a theory of value that I think is implicit in animal liberation, and explain how this theory is consistent with strong environmental commitments. I conclude with some observations about problems that remain.
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  • A Refutation of Environmental Ethics.Janna Thompson - 1990 - Environmental Ethics 12 (2):147-160.
    An environmental ethic holds that some entities in nature or in natural states of affairs are intrinsically valuable. I argue that proposals for an environmental ethic either fail to satisfy requirements which any ethical system must satisty to be an ethic or they fail to give us reason to suppose that the values they promote are intrinsic values. If my arguments are correct, then environmental ethics is not properly ethics at all.
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  • Philosophical aspects of astrobiology.Erik Persson - 2013 - In David Dunér, Joel Pathermore, Erik Persson & Gustav Holmberg, The History and Philosophy of Astrobiology. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 29-48.
    During antiquity, the astronomical questions of the day and the methods used to formulate and answer them were clearly within the realm of philosophy. That changed most notably in the sixteenth century when Tycho Brahe turned astronomy into a modern empirical science by formulating (in principle) testable hypotheses, figuring out how to test them, building the proper instruments, and making – for that time – very accurate and systematic observations of the sky. These observations eventually led to the modern view (...)
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  • Intrinsic Value, Moral Standing, and Species.Rick O’Neil - 1997 - Environmental Ethics 19 (1):45-52.
    Environmental philosophers often conflate the concepts of intrinsic value and moral standing. As a result, individualists needlessly deny intrinsic value to species, while holists falsely attribute moral standing to species. Conceived either as classes or as historical individuals, at least some species possess intrinsic value. Nevertheless, even if a species has interests or a good of its own, it cannot have moral standing because species lack sentience. Although there is a basis for duties toward some species (in terms of their (...)
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  • What is Wrong with Extinction?Erik Persson - 2008 - Dissertation, Lund University
    The aim of this investigation is to answer the question of why it is prima facie morally wrong to cause or contribute to the extinction of species. The first potential answer investigated in the book is that other species are instrumentally valuable for human beings. The results of this part of the investigation are that many species are instrumentally valuable for human beings but that not all species are equally valuable in all cases. The instrumental values of different species also (...)
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  • Toward the moral considerability of species and ecosystems.Lawrence E. Johnson - 1992 - Environmental Ethics 14 (2):145-157.
    I develop the thesis that species and ecosystems are living entities with morally significant interests in their own right and defend it against leading objections. Contrary to certain claims, it is possible to individuate such entities sufficiently well. Indeed, there is a sense in which such entities define their own nature. I also consider and reject the argument that species and ecosystems cannot have interests or even traits in their own right because evolution does not proceed on that level. Although (...)
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  • Recent work on consciousness.Joseph Levine - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):379-404.
    This paper surveys current theories on the nature of conscious experience, from traditional central state identity theories and functionalism, to more recent higher-order and representationalist theories. It is concluded that no current theory really solves the fundamental problem of how to incorporate conscious experience into the physical world, though much progress has been made.
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  • Ethics and Instrumentalism: A Response to Janna Thompson.Val Plumwood - 1991 - Environmental Ethics 13 (2):139-149.
    I argue that Janna Thompson’s critique of environmental ethics misrepresents the work of certain proponents of non-instrumental value theory and overlooks the ways in which intrinsie values have been related to valuers and their preferences. Some of the difficulties raised for environmental ethics are real but would only be fatal if environmental ethics could not be supplemented by a wider environmental philosophy and practice. The proper context and motivation for the development of non-instrumental theories is not that of an objectivist (...)
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  • The trouble with intrinsic value : an ethical primer for astrobiology.Kelly C. Smith - 2009 - In Constance M. Bertka, Exploring the Origin, Extent, and Future of Life: Philosophical, Ethical and Theological Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.
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  • Skapat liv och livets värde.Erik Persson - 2017 - In Jessica Abbott & Erik Persson, LIV – Utomjordiskt, Syntetiskt, Artificiellt. Lund, Sverige: Pufendorfinstitutet. pp. 219-237.
    Om människan någon gång kommer att få förmågan att skapa nya livsformer, hur kommer det att påverka livets värde? Detta är en fråga som kan vara en källa till oro när man diskuterar konstgjort liv, men är oron befogad? I ett försök att svara på den frågan kommer jag att gå igenom några möjliga skäl till varför förmågan att skapa konstgjort liv skulle hota livets värde, och se om de verkligen ger oss skäl att oroa oss.
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