Starting from a concept of reasonableness as well-consideredness, it is discussed in what way science could serve as a model for reasonable argumentation. It turns out that in order to be reasonable two requirements have to be fulfilled. The argumentation should comply with rules which are both problem-valid and intersubjectively valid. Geometrical and anthropological perspectives don't meet these criteria, but a critical perspective does. It is explained that a pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation which agrees with this critical perspective is indeed (...) problem-valid and that strong pragmatic and utilitarian arguments can be given for its intersubjective validity. Thus, conventional validity is promoted for a code of conduct for discussants who want to resolve their disputes reasonably by way of a critical discussion. (shrink)

Argument-giving reasons for a view-is our model of rational dispute resolution. Fogelin suggests that certain "deep" disagreements cannot be resolved in this way because features of their context "undercut the conditions essential to arguing" . In this paper we add some detail to Fogelin's treatment of intractable disagreements. In doing so we distinguish between his relatively modest claim that some disputes cannot be resolved through argument and his more radical claim that such disputes are beyond rational resolution. This distinction, along (...) with some ofthe detail we add to Fogelin's treatment, sheds some useful light on the project of informal logic. (shrink)

A compact, coherent introduction to the study of rational belief, this text provides points of entry to such areas of philosophy as theory of knowledge, methodology of science, and philosophy of language. The book is accessible to all undergraduates and presupposes no philosophical training.

According to Robert Fogelin, deep disagreements are disagreements about fundamental principles. He argues that deep disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. In this paper I argue against this thesis. A key part of the response depends upon the claim that disagreements can be rationally resolved not only by one participant rationally coming around to the other's point of view, but also by both of them rationally suspending judgment about the disputed proposition. I also claim that suspension of judgment may be the (...) rational response in the examples Fogelin characterizes as deep disagreements. I deny that this result has any troubling implications for critical thinking. (shrink)

Starting from a concept of reasonableness as well-consideredness, it is discussed in what way science could serve as a model for reasonable argumentation. It turns out that in order to be reasonable two requirements have to be fulfilled. The argumentation should comply with rules which are both problem-valid and intersubjectively valid. Geometrical and anthropological perspectives don't meet these criteria, but a critical perspective does. It is explained that a pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation which agrees with this critical perspective is indeed (...) problem-valid and that strong pragmatic and utilitarian arguments can be given for its intersubjective validity. Thus, conventional validity is promoted for a code of conduct for discussants who want to resolve their disputes reasonably by way of a critical discussion. (shrink)

The judgment competent reasoners exhibit in deciding when reasoning should not be used to resolve disagreements is eroded by adopting the popular strategy of ascending to higher levels of generality. That strategy encourages disputants to believeoften incorrectly-that they stand on some common ground that can be exploited to reach agreement. But if we regularly assume that we share values and interests with our opponents in seemingly intractable disputes, we risk losing the ability to judge whether or not we share enough. (...) And when we lose track of the difference between promising and unpromising conditions for reasoning, we end up trying to reason at the wrong times. Such reasoning can in turn seriously damage our reasoning skills themselves. (shrink)

Henry Richardson argues that we can determine our ends rationally. He constructs a rich and original theory of how we can reason about our final goals. Richardson defuses the counter-arguments for the limits of rational deliberation, and develops interesting ideas about how his model might be extended to interpersonal deliberation of ends, taking him to the borders of political theory. Along the way Richardson offers illuminating discussions of, inter alia, Aristotle, Aquinas, Sidgwick, and Dewey, as well as the work of (...) several contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

A Theory of Argument is an advanced textbook intended for students in philosophy, communications studies and linguistics who have completed at least one course in argumentation theory, information logic, critical thinking or formal logic. Containing nearly 400 exercises, Mark Vorobej develops a novel approach to argument interpretation and evaluation. One of the key themes of the book is that we cannot succeed in distinguishing good argument from bad arguments until we learn to listen carefully to others. Part I develops a (...) relativistic account of argument cogency that allows for rational disagreement. Part II offers a comprehensive and rigorous account of argument diagramming. Hybrid arguments are contrasted with linked and convergent arguments, and a novel technique is introduced for graphically recording disagreements with authorial claims. (shrink)