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A Defense of Taking Some Novels As Arguments

In B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, G. Mitchell & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation [CD-ROM]. Sic Sat. pp. 1169-1177 (2015)

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  1. (1 other version)Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Death.--The absurd.--Moral luck.--Sexual perversion.--War and massacre.--Ruthlessness in public life.--The policy of preference.--Equality.--The fragmentation of value.--Ethics without biology.--Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness.--What is it like to be a bat?--Panpsychism.--Subjective and objective.
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  • Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Hilary Putnam deals in this book with some of the most fundamental persistent problems in philosophy: the nature of truth, knowledge and rationality. His aim is to break down the fixed categories of thought which have always appeared to define and constrain the permissible solutions to these problems.
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  • Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.
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  • Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature.Martha C. Nussbaum - 1990 - Philosophy 68 (266):564-566.
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  • The unreliability of naive introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.
    We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. We are not simply fallible at the margins but broadly inept. Examples highlighted in this essay include: emotional experience (for example, is it entirely bodily; does joy have a common, distinctive phenomenological core?), peripheral vision (how broad and stable is the region of visual clarity?), and the (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Transcendental arguments.Barry Stroud - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (9):241-256.
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  • Fearing fictions.Kendall L. Walton - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):5-27.
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  • (1 other version)Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1980 - Critica 12 (34):125-133.
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  • The authority of affect.Mark Johnston - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):181-214.
    A while ago I pulled the short straw, and became chair of my department. One nice part of the job is to praise people I work with, which I can do sincerely because they are very praiseworthy. I also have to read a lot of praise by others; the familiar things—project evaluations, letters of recommendation, promotion dossiers, and so on and so forth. As a result, I have learnt to attend to praise a little more closely.
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  • (1 other version)Three varieties of knowledge.Donald Davidson - 1992 - In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 153-166.
    I know, for the most part, what I think, want, and intend, and what my sensations are. In addition, I know a great deal about the world around me. I also sometimes know what goes on in other people's minds. Each of these three kinds of empirical knowledge has its distinctive characteristics. What I know about the contents of my own mind I generally know without investigation or appeal to evidence. There are exceptions, but the primacy of unmediated self-knowledge is (...)
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  • Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories.Gregory Currie - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    This text offers a reflection on the nature and significance of narrative in human communication.
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  • (1 other version)Three Varieties of Knowledge.Donald Davidson - 1991 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30:153-166.
    I know, for the most part, what I think, want, and intend, and what my sensations are. In addition, I know a great deal about the world around me. I also sometimes know what goes on in other people's minds. Each of these three kinds of empirical knowledge has its distinctive characteristics. What I know about the contents of my own mind I generally know without investigation or appeal to evidence. There are exceptions, but the primacy of unmediated self-knowledge is (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Transcendental Arguments.Barry Stroud - 1968 - Sententiae 33 (2):51-63.
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  • Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature.Alan Montefiore - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):105.
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  • Genuine Rational Fictional Emotions.Tamar Szabó Gendler & Karson Kovakovich - 2005 - In Mathew Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 241-253.
    The “paradox of fictional emotions” involves a trio of claims that are jointly inconsistent but individually plausible. Resolution of the paradox thus requires that we deny at least one of these plausible claims. The paradox has been formulated in various ways, but for the purposes of this chapter, we will focus on the following three claims, which we will refer to respectively as the Response Condition, the Belief Condition and the Coordination Condition.
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  • Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature.John Horton - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (169):492-495.
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  • Transcendental arguments: A plea for modesty.Robert Stern - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):143-161.
    A modest transcendental argument is one that sets out merely to establish how things need to appear to us or how we need to believe them to be, rather than how things are. Stroud's claim to have established that all transcendental arguments must be modest in this way is criticised and rejected. However, a different case for why we should abandon ambitious transcendental arguments is presented: namely, that when it comes to establishing claims about how things are, there is no (...)
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  • Novels as Arguments.Gilbert Plumer - 2011 - In Frans H. van Eemeren, Bart Garssen, David Godden & Gordon Mitchell (eds.), Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Rozenberg / Sic Sat. pp. 1547-1558.
    The common view is that no novel IS an argument, though it might be reconstructed as one. This is curious, for we almost always feel the need to reconstruct arguments even when they are uncontroversially given as arguments, as in a philosophical text. We make the points as explicit, orderly, and (often) brief as possible, which is what we do in reconstructing a novel’s argument. The reverse is also true. Given a text that is uncontroversially an explicit, orderly, and brief (...)
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  • Narration as Argument.Paula Olmos (ed.) - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
    In this paper I explore the possibilities of acknowledging the argumentative character of narration. Two basic models will be revised: 1) primary narratives, regarding issues and facts under discussion, which may work as implicit arguments about the coincidence between discourse and reality via their own internal plausibility and 2) secondary narratives, imaginatively inserted in discourse, and serving as evidence for diverse lines of analogical or exemplary argumentation.
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  • Argument and Perception: The Role of Literature in Moral Inquiry.Michael R. DePaul - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (10):552-565.
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  • Really believing in fiction.David B. Suits - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):369–386.
    How is it possible to respond emotionally to that which we believe is not the case? All of the many responses to this "paradox of fiction" make one or more of three important mistakes: (1) neglecting the context of believing, (2) assuming that belief is an all-or-nothing affair, and (3) assuming that if you believe that p then you cannot also reasonably believe that not-p. My thesis is that we react emotionally to stories because we do believe what stories tell (...)
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  • Cognition and Literary Ethical Criticism.Gilbert Plumer - 2011 - In Frank Zenker (ed.), Argumentation: Cognition & Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18--21, 2011. OSSA. pp. 1-9.
    “Ethical criticism” is an approach to literary studies that holds that reading certain carefully selected novels can make us ethically better people, e.g., by stimulating our sympathetic imagination (Nussbaum). I try to show that this nonargumentative approach cheapens the persuasive force of novels and that its inherent bias and censorship undercuts what is perhaps the principal value and defense of the novel—that reading novels can be critical to one’s learning how to think.
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  • Literature and Truthfulness.Gregory Currie - 2012 - In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer. pp. 23-31.
    How should we characterise the view that we can learn about the mind from literature? Should we say that such learning consists in acquiring knowledge of truths? That option is more attractive than it is sometimes made to seem by those who oppose propositional knowledge to practical knowledge or “knowing how”. But some writers on this topic—Lamarque and Olsen—argue that, while literature may express interesting propositions, it is not their truth that matters, but their “content”. Matters to what? To literary (...)
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  • Fictional entities: Talking about them and having feelings about them.Ralph W. Clark - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (4):341 - 349.
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  • Telling stories.Gregory Currie - 2011 - The Philosophers' Magazine 54 (54):44-49.
    As Dr Johnson said, argument is like a crossbow: it owes its force to the mechanisms of the bow, as argument owes its force to its intrinsic rational power. But testimony is like the longbow: we cannot tell what it will do unless we know the strength of the user.
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