I reject the contention that an important theoretical difference exists between formal and natural languages.

The problem discussed here is to find a basis for a uniform treatment of the relation between pronouns and their antecedents, taking into account both linguists' and philosophers' approaches. The two main candidates would appear to be the linguists' notion of coreference and the philosophers' notion of pronouns as variables. The notion of coreference can be extended to many but not all cases where the antecedent is non-referential. The pronouns-as-variables approach appears to come closer to full generality, but there are (...) some examples of pronouns of laziness which appear to resist either of the two approaches. (shrink)

I am going to describe a variant formulation of classical extensional first-order logic and contrast it with the standard formulation. The formulation I will give is in one clear sense equivalent to the standard one, and it is a routine task to show that it is equivalent to it in this sense. So one might regard my formulation as a mere notational variation. But there are also ways in which the two formulations I will contrast are not equivalent, and I (...) will argue that these ways reflect an important conceptual difference between them. The differences become more important as one generalizes or extends classical logic in various ways, but they are there even in the classical systems. (shrink)

Investigates the application of logic to problem solving and computer programming. Requires no previous knowledge in this field, and therefore can be used as an introduction to logic, the theory of problem-solving and computer programming. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.