This paper sees me clarify, elaborate, and defend the conclusions reached in my ‘Musical Works as Eternal Types’ in the wake of objections raised by Robert Howell, R. A. Sharpe, and Saam Trivedi. In particular, I claim that the thesis that musical works are discovered rather than created by their composers is obligatory once we commit ourselves to thinking of works of music as types, and once we properly understand the ontological nature of types and properties. The central argument of (...) the paper is ‘the argument from the eternal existence of properties’, its moral being that types are eternal entities because they inherit their existence conditions from their eternally existent property-associates. The two key premises in this argument—that properties exist eternally, and that a type exists just in case its property-associate exists—are motivated and then defended at length. (shrink)

Various criticisms have been brought against a Platonistic construal of the musical work: that is, against the view that the musical work is a universal or kind or type, of which the performances are instances or tokens. Some of these criticisms are: (1) that musical works possess perceptual properties and universals do not; (2) that musical works are created and universals cannot be; (3) that universals cannot be destroyed and musical works can; (4) that parts of tokens of the same (...) type can be interchanged and still yield tokens of that type, whereas we cannot interchange parts of performances of the same work and still get performances of the work. Of these claims, (1) and (2) seem to be true, but are not incompatible with a Platonistic construal of the musical work, whereas (3) and (4) just seem to be false and, therefore, of no concern to the musical Platonist. (shrink)

Various criticisms have been brought against a Platonistic construal of the musical work: that is, against the view that the musical work is a universal or kind or type, of which the performances are instances or tokens. Some of these criticisms are: (1) that musical works possess perceptual properties and universals do not; (2) that musical works are created and universals cannot be; (3) that universals cannot be destroyed and musical works can; (4) that parts of tokens of the same (...) type can be interchanged and still yield tokens of that type, whereas we cannot interchange parts of performances of the same work and still get performances of the work. Of these claims, (1) and (2) seem to be true, but are not incompatible with a Platonistic construal of the musical work, whereas (3) and (4) just seem to be false and, therefore, of no concern to the musical Platonist. (shrink)

Various criticisms have been brought against a Platonistic construal of the musical work: that is, against the view that the musical work is a universal or kind or type, of which the performances are instances or tokens. Some of these criticisms are: that musical works possess perceptual properties and universals do not; that musical works are created and universals cannot be; that universals cannot be destroyed and musical works can; that parts of tokens of the same type can be interchanged (...) and still yield tokens of that type, whereas we cannot interchange parts of performances of the same work and still get performances of the work. Of these claims, and seem to be true, but are not incompatible with a Platonistic construal of the musical work, whereas and just seem to be false and, therefore, of no concern to the musical Platonist. (shrink)

Can a musical work be created? Some say ‘no’. But, we argue, there is no handbook of universally accepted metaphysical truths that they can use to justify their answer. Others say ‘yes’. They have to find abstract objects that can plausibly be identified with musical works, show that abstract objects of this sort can be created, and show that such abstract objects can persist. But, we argue, none of the standard views about what a musical work is allows musical works (...) both to be created and to persist. (shrink)

Are works of music types of performance or are they continuants? Types are unchanging entities that could not have been otherwise; continuants can undergo change through time and could have been different. Picking up on this distinction, Guy Rohrbaugh has recently argued that musical works are continuants rather than performance-types. This paper replies to his arguments and, in the course of so doing, elaborates and defends the conception of musical works as types of performance. I end the article by arguing (...) that the conception of musical works as continuants is under-motivated and, ultimately, obscure. (shrink)