Although it remains an empirical question whether the U.S. is experiencing greater levels of hate-motivated-conduct than in the past, it is beyond dispute that the concept of ‘hate crime’ has been institutionalized in social, political, and legal discourse in the U.S. From the introduction and politicization of the term hate crime in the late 1970s to the continued enforcement of hate crime law at the beginning of the twenty-first century, social movements have constructed the problem of bias-motivated violence in particular (...) ways, while politicians at both the federal and state level have made legislation that defines the parameters of hate crime. Accordingly, this article identifies and examines the parameters of a hate crime canon in the U.S., which can first and foremost be described as a body of law that 1) provides anew state policy action, by either creating anew criminal category, altering an existing law, or enhancing penalties for select extant crimes when they are committed for bias reasons; 2) contains an intent standard, which refers to the subjective intention of the perpetrator rather than relying solely on the basis of objective behavior; and 3) specifies a list of protected social statuses, such as race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, disabilities, etc. Arguing that these features constitute the core parameters of the hate crime canon and attendant discourse in the U.S., this article offers a critical assessment of the emergence, institutionalization, and arguable consequences of ‘hate crime’ as a recently developed social fact - in the Durkheimian sense of the word - that is consequential for the politics of victimization in the modern era and the social control of violence against minorities more particularly. (shrink)

Tyler conducted a longitudinal study of 1,575 Chicago inhabitants to determine why people obey the law. His findings show that the law is obeyed primarily because people believe in respecting legitimate authority, not because they fear punishment. The author concludes that lawmakers and law enforcers would do much better to make legal systems worthy of respect than to try to instill fear of punishment.

Unger shows how a changed practice of legal analysis can reshape the dominant institutions of representative democracy, market economy and free civil society.

Judicial activism is in serious, though undeserved, trouble. The current impasse over its role in constitutional discourse pits two opposed positions committed to different paradigms of judicial activism against one another. One side condemns activist judges for engaging in ultra vires adjudication by reading their idiosyncratic values into the Constitution. In this view, the charge of judicial activism has significant content and should be deployed to restrain renegade judges. The other side insists that calling someone a "judicial activist" has only (...) emotive content and is used merely as an empty epithet denouncing judges with whom one disagrees. This Article redirects the controversy over judicial activism by distinguishing between two different, but interrelated, levels of constitutional discourse: the surface level and the deep level. The problem of judicial activism exists on the surface level of constitutional discourse and will remain irresolvable on that level. However, once we attend to the deep level of constitutional discourse, the role of judicial activism becomes clear. The presence of judicial activism on the surface structure of constitutional discourse reveals on the deep structure reasonable disagreement over the meaning of key constitutional provisions. The idea of "reasonable disagreement" is profitably explicated by combining what social theorist W.B. Gallie called "essentially contested concepts" with the political philosopher John Rawls' important categorization of "the burdens of judgment." These obstacles to rational consensus are endemic to a republican democracy. Consequently, reasonable disagreement over key constitutional provisions should not be regarded negatively; it is an inevitable and positive feature of any society championing liberty, equality, and pluralism. However, the inevitability and desirability of reasonable disagreement has institutional consequences for constitutional review. When reasonable disagreement is inevitable, legislatures, not courts should have the last word on constitutional meaning. (shrink)