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  1. (1 other version)Minds, Machines and Gödel.John R. Lucas - 1961 - Philosophy 36 (137):112-127.
    Gödei's Theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I have put the matter to has confessed to similar thoughts, but has felt reluctant to commit himself definitely until he could see the whole argument set out, with all objections fully stated and properly met. This I attempt to do.
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  • (1 other version)Minds, Machines and Gödel.J. R. Lucas - 1961 - Etica E Politica 5 (1):1.
    In this article, Lucas maintains the falseness of Mechanism - the attempt to explain minds as machines - by means of Incompleteness Theorem of Gödel. Gödel’s theorem shows that in any system consistent and adequate for simple arithmetic there are formulae which cannot be proved in the system but that human minds can recognize as true; Lucas points out in his turn that Gödel’s theorem applies to machines because a machine is the concrete instantiation of a formal system: therefore, for (...)
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  • Epistemic theories and the interpretation of gödel's incompleteness theorems.William N. Reinhardt - 1986 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 15 (4):427--74.
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  • On the philosophical relevance of Gödel's incompleteness theorems.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (4):513-534.
    A survey of more philosophical applications of Gödel's incompleteness results.
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  • (2 other versions)Minds, Machines and Gödel.George S. Boolos - 1968 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (4):613-615.
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  • In defense of epistemic arithmetic.Leon Horsten - 1998 - Synthese 116 (1):1-25.
    This paper presents a defense of Epistemic Arithmetic as used for a formalization of intuitionistic arithmetic and of certain informal mathematical principles. First, objections by Allen Hazen and Craig Smorynski against Epistemic Arithmetic are discussed and found wanting. Second, positive support is given for the research program by showing that Epistemic Arithmetic can give interesting formulations of Church's Thesis.
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