This paper follows in Pavel Tichý’s concept of distinguishing between trivial (i.e. constant) and non-trivial properties. This classification has been extended by Pavel Cmorej who distinguished two kinds of non-trivial properties, namely purely empirical and partly essential (which are partly empirical) properties (partly essential property is essential for certain individual(s), but that it is not for other(s)). The present study provides rigorous formal definitions of trivial / non-trivial, essential / non-essential, and purely empirical / partly essential / purely essential properties (...) with respect to the possible partiality of these properties. In addition, a definition of trivially void properties completing the classification of the kinds of properties to form a quadruplet is proposed. Furthermore, the introduction of the concept of accidental properties gives rise to another (yet not equivalent) quadruplet: purely accidental / partly essential (i.e. partly accidental) / purely essential / void properties. (shrink)

The metaphysical problem of individuation requires an answer to two different but intimately related questions: 1) How are we to characterize individuality ontologically? To what ontological category or logical type does individuality belong? 2) What sort of distinction is there between the individuality and nature of an individual, e.g., a real distinction, a modal distinction, a distinction of reason, or some other distinction My purpose in this article is to clarify a bare particular account of individuation and respond to objections (...) that have been raised against bare particulars as individuators. (shrink)

In his article "world and essence" ("phil. Rev." 1970, Pages 461-492) plantinga submitted that (a) individuals have essences and (b) the essence of an individual is a non-Trivial property which can be completely known only to god. In my note it is shown that on plantinga's own definitions each individual x has exactly one essence, The trivial property of x-Identity. Thus (b) fails.

In the first part of this paper, the author analyzes several unacceptable views of properties of physical objects and justifies the familiar explication, according to which properties of physical objects are certain functions defined on the set of all couples w,t, where w is a possible world and t is a moment of time . On the background of the indicated understanding of properties, the author demonstrates that there exist empirical essential properties. An empirical property is understood as a property, (...) the extension of which cannot be identified without applying experience. He distinguishes two kinds of essential properties: purely essential and partially essential. A purely essential property has the same extension at every world-time couple. The extension of a partially essential properties changes in the logical space, but there exists a non-empty set of objects which is a subset of their extension at every world-time couple. Every partially essential property is empirical. The author pays special attention to the essential properties expressible by means of expressions of the form ∨ Q) where P, Q are non-essential empirical properties that are allied through some objects X1, ..., Xn - i.e., the property ∨ Q) belongs to the objects X1, ..., Xn at every world-time couple. In the last part of the paper, the author demonstrates that every empirical property of the type where ”<” denotes the relation of being a part of, and ”I” stands for any physical object, is purely essential. The assumption that the extensions of these properties are changeable, entails unacceptable consequences. (shrink)