It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the (...) first order," which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires. (shrink)

Descartes se contredit-il en alléguant d'une part que certains choix d'un être fini sont face à l'évidence inéluctable et en alléguant d'autre part que l'indifférence absolue est une condition nécessaire de tout choix? Notre réponse est négative. En même temps il faut admettre, selon nous, que la méthode dont Descartes se sert pour s'échapper à la contradiction n'en amène qu'une autre.