This article examines how the Kashmiri non-dualistic Śaiva philosophers Utpaladeva (tenth century) and Abhinavagupta (10th–11th centuries) present and criticize a theory expounded by certain Buddhist philosophers, identified by the two Śaiva authors as Sautrāntikas. According to this theory, no entity external to consciousness can ever be perceived since perceived objects are nothing but internal aspects (ākāra) of consciousness. Nonetheless we must infer the existence of external entities so as to account for the fact that consciousness is aware of a variety (...) of objects: just as a mirror takes on a variegated appearance only by reflecting a multiplicity of objects that remain external to it, in the same way, phenomenal variety can be explained only by assuming the existence of various objects external to consciousness. In Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās I, 5, 8–9 and their commentaries, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta endeavour to criticize this theory, which challenges their own idealistic principles: according to them, the Sautrāntikas’ inference is neither legitimate nor even possible. The passage is particularly telling as regards the strategy developed by Pratyabhijñā philosophers with respect to their Buddhist opponents: they make use of certain arguments propounded by Dharmakīrti in defense of Vijñānavāda in order to criticize the Sautrāntikas’ inference, but they also exploit this discussion to underline the superiority of their idealism over that of the Vijñānavādins. (shrink)

It is a well-known fact that the Śaiva nondualistic philosopher Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975) adopted the Sāṃkhya principle according to which the effect must exist in some way before the operation of its cause (satkāryavāda). Johannes Bronkhorst has highlighted the paradox inherent in this appropriation: Utpaladeva is a staunch supporter of the satkāryavāda, but whereas Sāṃkhya authors consider it as a means of proving the existence of an unconscious matter, the Śaiva exploits it so as to establish his monistic idealism, (...) in perfect contradiction with the Sāṃkhya dualism of matter and consciousness. How does Utpaladeva achieve this complete reversal of meaning of the satkāryavāda? The present article argues that the elliptical verses of the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā dealing with this issue have been partly misunderstood so far due to the loss of Utpaladeva’s own detailed commentary (Vivr̥ti) on this passage: Abhinavagupta’s two commentaries, however terse in this respect, clearly show that a crucial part of Utpaladeva’s reasoning remains implicit in the verses. The article therefore attempts to reconstruct the gist of Utpaladeva’s strategy by having recourse to various other Śaiva sources, including Somānanda’s Śivadr̥ṣṭi and Utpaladeva’s own commentary thereon. This examination shows that Utpaladeva’s appropriation of the satkāryavāda rests on a profound transformation of the Sāṃkhya notions of manifestation (abhivyakti) and potentiality (śakti), and that his criticism of the Sāṃkhya understanding of causality might target the Śaiva dualists as well as Sāṃkhya authors. (shrink)

Idealism is the core of the Pratyabhijñã philosophy: the main goal of Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–950 AD) and of his commentator Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025 AD) is to establish that nothing exists outside of consciousness. In the course of their demonstration, these Śaiva philosophers endeavour to distinguish their idealism from that of a rival system, the Buddhist Vijñānavāda. This article aims at examining the concept of otherness (paratva) as it is presented in the Pratyabhijñā philosophy in contrast with that of (...) the Vijñānavādins’. Although, according to the Pratyabhijñā, the other subjects are not ultimately real since all subjects are nothing but limited manifestations of a single absolute subject, the fact that we are aware of their existence in the practical world has to be accounted for. The Vijñānavādins explain it by arguing the we infer the others’ existence. The Pratyabhijñā philosophers, while refuting their opponents’ reasoning as it is expounded in Dharmakīrti’s Santānāntarasiddhi, develop a particulary original analysis of our awareness of the others, stating that this awareness is neither a perception (pratyakṣa) nor an inference (anumāna), but rather a guess (ūha) in which we sense the others’ freedom (svātantrya). (shrink)

The fields of indology and Indian philosophy owe to Raffaele Torella one of the most exciting manuscript discoveries made in the last decades, namely, that of the only extensive fragment thus far known of Utpaladeva’s own Vivṛti on his Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā. Thanks to the edition of this very incomplete codex unicus (it only covers 13 verses out of 190), we are now able to compare this known part of Utpaladeva’s lost text with the numerous annotations written in the margins of the (...) manuscripts of Abhinavagupta’s commentaries on the Pratyabhijñā treatise. This comparison shows that some of these marginalia are quotations – and in a number of cases, rather lengthy ones – of Utpaladeva’s Vivṛti. The article, which presents the first results of an ongoing study of the marginal annotations found in manuscripts of Abhinavagupta’s Pratyabhijñā commentaries, offers an edition and annotated translation of a hitherto unknown passage of the Vivṛti on kārikās 1.5.4 and 1.5.5. The fragment bears on the Buddhist controversy between Vijñānavādins and Sautrāntikas over the existence of other conscious streams (santānāntara) and on the possibility of intersubjectivity if, as the Vijñānavādins claim, nothing exists outside consciousness. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive presentation of the Pratyabhij philosophy (elaborated in the 10th and 11th centuries by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta) by showing how its main concepts arose from the confrontation of aiva religious dogmas ...

The Pratyabhijñā system, elaborated in the tenth and eleventh centuries by the Kashmiri philosophers Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, presents a rational justification of the metaphysical principles contained in the Śaiva nondualistic scriptures. However, contrary to what one might expect, many arguments to which Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta resort when defending their idealism belong to Buddhist rather than Śaiva sources. This article examines the profound influence, in this respect, of the Buddhist “logico-epistemological school” on the Pratyabhijñā system. But it also shows that Utpaladeva (...) and Abhinavagupta are not unknowingly or unwittingly influenced by their Buddhist opponents: they systematically emphasize this influence, thus taking full responsibility for appropriating their rivals' concepts. Moreover, they highlight their fundamental divergence regarding the way consciousness manifests a seemingly external and diverse universe, most notably by replacing the Vijñānavādins' traditional analogy: according to the Śaivas, perceived objects should not be compared to dreamt objects, but to yogins' creations. https://paris3.academia.edu/IsabelleRati%C3%A9. (shrink)