In “Movies, Narrative and Emotion” there is an attempt to suggest the ways in which a certain form of narrative organization, to which we can call “erotetic narration,” This can be co-ordinated with the emotional address of the motion picture in terms of what can be called “criterial prefocusing.” On this view, the primary way in which the emotions are engaged is character-directed, the protagonist’s goals providing grounds which generate the narrative questions that the movie goes on to answer.

This paper begins by presenting a simple model that maps some salient positions on the topic of cinema as philosophy, including the very strong claims that are constitutive of what has been stipulated to be “the bold thesis.” It is contended that examples that have been adduced in the literature as substantiating that bold thesis in fact only support weaker claims. It is argued in favor of accepting some such theses on the topic. It is then introduced a number of (...) variables that might be worth keeping in mind as we ponder the philosophical merits or demerits of various cinematic works. (shrink)

This chapter critically examines the idea that some cinematic artworks “do philosophy”. It is argued that any interesting “film as philosophy” thesis must satisfy two conditions: (FP1) In any advance in philosophical understanding attributable to a cinematic artwork, the philosophical content through which such an advance is accomplished must be articulated in a manner that is distinctively cinematic, on a proper understanding of the latter; (FP2) The advance in philosophical understanding attributable to a cinematic artwork must occur in the course (...) of our experiential engagement with that work, rather than in some distinct philosophical activity to which that engagement provides an extractable input. These conditions, it is argued, are not satisfied by the kinds of examples of ‘film as philosophy’ – cinematic ‘thought experiments’ – most often cited by philosophers. While (FP2) might be satisfied given a particular model of learning from thought experiments, (FP1) remains problematic. A second more elusive possibility is that philosophical understanding is advanced through affective qualities of the experiences cinematically elicited in receivers of a narrative film. After examining how cinematic affect is generated and the kind of philosophical work that such affect might do, Robert Sinnerbrink’s notion of “cinematic thinking” is critically assessed and tested against some relevant examples. (shrink)

One way that philosophy can be related to film is via the notion of experiment. This connection is usually discussed in terms of similarities between film and the thought experiments that can be found within philosophical texts. However, rather than subsuming film to the philosophical thought experiment, which risks missing what film itself contributes to the proceedings, it is more interesting to see how the cinematic medium might allow for forms of experimentation that go beyond what can be undertaken within (...) the traditional philosophical text. Film as experimental in this sense offers enlarged possibilities for putting ideas and presuppositions to the test of experience. It can also be seen as pointing to an enlarged conception of what constitutes philosophical reflection itself. This is a Foucauldean idea of philosophy as a practice of thought that transforms the thinker, not through reasons justified by foundations, but through experiences that call one’s foundational assumptions into question and make it impossible to continue thinking in the same way. (shrink)