In this article I argue that Part II of the Family LawAct 1996 gives expression to a new form ofresponsibility. I begin by suggesting thatresponsible behaviour has shifted from prohibiting orrequiring particular actions: we now exhibitresponsibility by our attitude towards our actions. I then examine where this new conception ofresponsibility has come from. Through an examinationof the work of post-liberal theorists, principallyMichael Sandel, I argue that a changing view ofpersonhood within post-liberal theory has led to aquestioning of the possibility of (...) choice, and that theabsence of choice necessitates a shift in thedefinition of responsible behaviour. If we are createdby our decisions then we cannot be held to account forour decisions, but only for the care we have takenover them. Responsibility is therefore measured notby our level of self-control but by our level ofself-awareness. Finally I examine the consequences ofthis shift in the meaning of responsibility. Withinthis framework autonomy is illusory thereforedecisions do not need to be respected. This explainswhy the implementation of Part II of the Family LawAct 1996 has been called into question. Within thisframework responsibility is relative therefore itextends indefinitely. This enables the Family Law Actto be uniquely intrusive and judgmental: everydivorcing couple, on being held up to scrutiny, isfound lacking. (shrink)

This text documents the various forms of feminist activism in the 1990s, exploring the meaning of feminist activism and its interpretation within women's studies and other disciplines. An historical overview of the development of feminist activism.

This commentary explores the scope and content of the Protection from Harassment Act, recently introduced in the UK, focusing in particular on s.3 which creates a civil cause of action for harassment. The author considers the strategic possibilities for feminists concerned with enhancing remedies for sexual harassment as well as the drawbacks of the Act, particularly its capacity to be deployed in a wide range of contexts not all of which necessarily promote justice or enhance civil and political rights. The (...) author concludes by emphasising the important role of the courts in defining and delineating the scope of the Act as well as exploring the possibility of continued development of the common law principle in Wilkinson v. Downton. (shrink)