- Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will.Daniel M. Wegner & T. Wheatley - 1999 - American Psychologist 54:480-492.details
|
|
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework.Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):1-37.details
|
|
Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: A testable taxonomy.Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Lionel Naccache, Jérôme Sackur & Claire Sergent - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):204-211.details
|
|
“If only…”: When counterfactual thoughts can reduce illusions of personal authorship.Laura Dannenberg, Jens Förster & Nils B. Jostmann - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):456-463.details
|
|
Feeling of doing in obsessive–compulsive checking.S. Belayachi & M. Van der Linden - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):534-546.details
|
|
On the inference of personal authorship: Enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information☆.Henk Aarts, Ruud Custers & Daniel M. Wegner - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (3):439-458.details
|
|
Reflecting on the action or its outcome: Behavior representation level modulates high level outcome priming effects on self-agency experiences.Anouk van der Weiden, Henk Aarts & Kirsten I. Ruys - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):21-32.details
|
|
Prime and probability: Causal knowledge affects inferential and predictive effects on self-agency experiences.Anouk van der Weiden, Henk Aarts & Kirsten I. Ruys - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1865-1871.details
|
|
Both motor prediction and conceptual congruency between preview and action-effect contribute to explicit judgment of agency.Atsushi Sato - 2009 - Cognition 110 (1):74-83.details
|
|
Feelings of control: Contingency determines experience of action.James W. Moore, David Lagnado, Darvany C. Deal & Patrick Haggard - 2009 - Cognition 110 (2):279-283.details
|
|
Awareness of action: Inference and prediction.James Moore - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):136-144.details
|
|
Unconscious modulation of the conscious experience of voluntary control.Katrin Linser & Thomas Goschke - 2007 - Cognition 104 (3):459-475.details
|
|
Preoccupied minds feel less control: Sense of agency is modulated by cognitive load.Nicholas Hon, Jia-Hou Poh & Chun-Siong Soon - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):556-561.details
|
|
Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Fiery A. Cushman, Lisa E. Stewart, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2009 - Cognition 111 (3):364-371.details
|
|
When moving without volition: implied self-causation enhances binding strength between involuntary actions and effects.Myrthel Dogge, Marloes Schaap, Ruud Custers, Daniel M. Wegner & Henk Aarts - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):501-506.details
|
|
Cortical information flow during inferences of agency.Myrthel Dogge, Dennis Hofman, Maria Boersma, H. Chris Dijkerman & Henk Aarts - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.details
|
|