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Switch to: Citations
References in:
Carnap’s Tolerance, Meaning, and Logical Pluralism
Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):426-443 (2002)
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Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a (...) |
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In this note I respond to Hartley Slater's argument 12 to the e ect that there is no such thing as paraconsistent logic. Slater's argument trades on the notion of contradictoriness in the attempt to show that the negation of paraconsistent logics is merely a subcontrary forming operator and not one which forms contradictories. I will show that Slater's argument fails, for two distinct reasons. Firstly, the argument does not consider the position of non-dialethic paraconsistency which rejects the possible truth (...) |
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What is the logic of entailment? The latter half of the twentieth century has seen, for even the simplest languages, a proliferation of distinct formal entailment systems, each having those willing to defend its status as the answer. Among those defenders, and among the most adamant and mutually critical, are the champions of strict implication and relevance logic. To an outsider, this debate must seem singularly odd. Here we have a group of philosophers who cannot agree on the validity of (...) |
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This paper uses the strengthened liar paradox as a springboard to illuminate two more general topics: i) the negation operator and the speech act of denial among speakers of English and ii) some ways the potential for acceptable language change is constrained by linguistic meaning. The general and special problems interact in reciprocally illuminating ways. The ultimate objective of the paper is, however, less to solve certain problems than to create others, by illustrating how the issues that form the topic (...) |
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What is the logic of entailment? The latter half of the twentieth century has seen, for even the simplest languages, a proliferation of distinct formal entailment systems, each having those willing to defend its status as the answer. Among those defenders, and among the most adamant and mutually critical, are the champions of strict implication and relevance logic. To an outsider, this debate must seem singularly odd. Here we have a group of philosophers who cannot agree on the validity of (...) |
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