This paper discusses critically the fundamental elements of the Stegmüller/Sneed-reconstruction of Kuhn's normal science concept. It is argued that a) Kuhn himself cannot accept this reconstruction if he wants to describe theory dynamics in the past; b) the reconstruction is not based on a pure non-statement view; c) to have a theory in the sense of Kuhn, should be related to the ordered pair <K,Iₒ> to ensure the desired constancy over time; d) the reconstruction implies, contrary to Kuhn, the ability (...) of rejecting a theory without having an alternative one; e) the rejection of a theory can be the result of a falsifying procedure and, therefore, theories are not immune from falsification; f) the reconstruction still contains rationality gaps; g) the reconstruction shows more precisely than Kuhn's work that Popper is right when he attacks normal scientist's behaviour; h) the positions of the Kuhnians and of the criticists could be reconciled partially. (shrink)

Summary The non-statement view of scientific theories contains a new conception of theoreticity: A function is „T-theoretical if T must be presupposed for its calculation. On the basis of this conception some philosophers came to the conclusion that scientific theories are not empirically testable because they contain T-theoretical functions. It is claimed that the attempt to test them ends in a circularity: The test of T presupposes T itself.