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  1. Cofinally Invariant Sequences and Revision.Edoardo Rivello - 2015 - Studia Logica 103 (3):599-622.
    Revision sequences are a kind of transfinite sequences which were introduced by Herzberger and Gupta in 1982 as the main mathematical tool for developing their respective revision theories of truth. We generalise revision sequences to the notion of cofinally invariant sequences, showing that several known facts about Herzberger’s and Gupta’s theories also hold for this more abstract kind of sequences and providing new and more informative proofs of the old results.
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  • Ultimate truth vis- à- vis stable truth.P. D. Welch - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):126-142.
    We show that the set of ultimately true sentences in Hartry Field's Revenge-immune solution model to the semantic paradoxes is recursively isomorphic to the set of stably true sentences obtained in Hans Herzberger's revision sequence starting from the null hypothesis. We further remark that this shows that a substantial subsystem of second-order number theory is needed to establish the semantic values of sentences in Field's relative consistency proof of his theory over the ground model of the standard natural numbers: -CA0 (...)
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  • Games for truth.P. D. Welch - 2009 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 15 (4):410-427.
    We represent truth sets for a variety of the well known semantic theories of truth as those sets consisting of all sentences for which a player has a winning strategy in an infinite two person game. The classifications of the games considered here are simple, those over the natural model of arithmetic being all within the arithmetical class of $\Sum_{3}^{0}$.
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  • A guide to truth predicates in the modern era.Michael Sheard - 1994 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (3):1032-1054.
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  • Revision and its rivals.Donald A. Martin - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:407-418.
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  • On Representing `True-in-L' in L.Geoffrey Hellman - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (4):1068-1071.
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  • Set-theoretic absoluteness and the revision theory of truth.Benedikt Löwe & Philip D. Welch - 2001 - Studia Logica 68 (1):21-41.
    We describe the solution of the Limit Rule Problem of Revision Theory and discuss the philosophical consequences of the fact that the truth set of Revision Theory is a complete 1/2 set.
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  • Naive semantics and the liar paradox.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (9):479-497.
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  • Notes on naive semantics.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.
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  • Robert L. Martin and Peter W. Woodruff. On representing ‘true-in-L' in L. Philosophia , vol. 5 no. 3 , pp. 213–217. - Saul Kripke. Outline of a theory of truth. The journal of philosophy, vol. 72 , pp. 690–716. - Anil Gupta. Truth and paradox. Journal of philosophical logic, vol. 11 , pp. 1–60. - Hans G. Herzberger. Notes on naive semantics. Journal of philosophical logic, vol. 11 , pp. 61–102. [REVIEW]Geoffrey Hellman - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (4):1068-1071.
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  • Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
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  • Gupta's rule of revision theory of truth.Nuel D. Belnap - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.
    Gupta’s Rule of Revision theory of truth builds on insights to be found in Martin and Woodruff and Kripke in order to permanently deepen our understanding of truth, of paradox, and of how we work our language while our language is working us. His concept of a predicate deriving its meaning by way of a Rule of Revision ought to impact significantly on the philosophy of language. Still, fortunately, he has left me something to.
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