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  1. Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):523-551.
    The model of self-referential truth presented in this paper, named Revision-theoretic supervaluation, aims to incorporate the philosophical insights of Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth into the formal framework of Kripkean fixed-point semantics. In Kripke-style theories the final set of grounded true sentences can be reached from below along a strictly increasing sequence of sets of grounded true sentences: in this sense, each stage of the construction can be viewed as an improvement on the previous ones. I want to (...)
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  • Some Notes on Truths and Comprehension.Thomas Schindler - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):449-479.
    In this paper we study several translations that map models and formulae of the language of second-order arithmetic to models and formulae of the language of truth. These translations are useful because they allow us to exploit results from the extensive literature on arithmetic to study the notion of truth. Our purpose is to present these connections in a systematic way, generalize some well-known results in this area, and to provide a number of new results. Sections 3 and 4 contain (...)
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  • (1 other version)Truth and Paradox.Anil Gupta - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):735-736.
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  • Axiomatic Theories of Truth.Volker Halbach - 2010 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    At the centre of the traditional discussion of truth is the question of how truth is defined. Recent research, especially with the development of deflationist accounts of truth, has tended to take truth as an undefined primitive notion governed by axioms, while the liar paradox and cognate paradoxes pose problems for certain seemingly natural axioms for truth. In this book, Volker Halbach examines the most important axiomatizations of truth, explores their properties and shows how the logical results impinge on the (...)
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  • Axiomatizing semantic theories of truth?Martin Fischer, Volker Halbach, Jönne Kriener & Johannes Stern - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (2):257-278.
    We discuss the interplay between the axiomatic and the semantic approach to truth. Often, semantic constructions have guided the development of axiomatic theories and certain axiomatic theories have been claimed to capture a semantic construction. We ask under which conditions an axiomatic theory captures a semantic construction. After discussing some potential criteria, we focus on the criterion of ℕ-categoricity and discuss its usefulness and limits.
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  • (1 other version)The Guptα-Belnαp Systems S and S* are not Axiomatisable.Philip Kremer - 1993 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (4):583-596.
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  • The Revision Theory of Truth.Anil Gupta & Nuel D. Belnap - 1993 - MIT Press.
    In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological..
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  • Semantics and the liar paradox.Albert Visser - 1989 - Handbook of Philosophical Logic 4 (1):617--706.
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  • Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
    A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truth-value gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences.
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  • Notes on naive semantics.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.
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  • (1 other version)Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
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  • Gupta's rule of revision theory of truth.Nuel D. Belnap - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.
    Gupta’s Rule of Revision theory of truth builds on insights to be found in Martin and Woodruff and Kripke in order to permanently deepen our understanding of truth, of paradox, and of how we work our language while our language is working us. His concept of a predicate deriving its meaning by way of a Rule of Revision ought to impact significantly on the philosophy of language. Still, fortunately, he has left me something to.
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  • The rationale behind revision-rule semantics.Lionel Shapiro - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):477 - 515.
    According to Gupta and Belnap, the “extensional behavior” of ‘true’ matches that of a circularly defined predicate. Besides promising to explain semantic paradoxicality, their general theory of circular predicates significantly liberalizes the framework of truth-conditional semantics. The authors’ discussions of the rationale behind that liberalization invoke two distinct senses in which a circular predicate’s semantic behavior is explained by a “revision rule” carrying hypothetical information about its extension. Neither attempted explanation succeeds. Their theory may however be modified to employ a (...)
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  • Truth, probability, and naive criteria.Michael Sheard - 2002 - In Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten (eds.), Principles of truth. New York: Hänsel-Hohenhausen. pp. 169-182.
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  • Definition and revision: A response to McGee and Martin.Anil Gupta - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:419-443.
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  • Revision Without Revision Sequences: Circular Definitions.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):57-85.
    The classical theory of definitions bans so-called circular definitions, namely, definitions of a unary predicate P, based on stipulations of the form $$Px =_{\mathsf {Df}} \phi,$$where ϕ is a formula of a fixed first-order language and the definiendumP occurs into the definiensϕ. In their seminal book The Revision Theory of Truth, Gupta and Belnap claim that “General theories of definitions are possible within which circular definitions [...] make logical and semantic sense” [p. IX]. In order to sustain their claim, they (...)
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  • Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation: Living with the Ghost.Toby Meadows - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):221-240.
    In J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, Leitgeb provides a theory of truth which is based on a theory of semantic dependence. We argue here that the conceptual thrust of this approach provides us with the best way of dealing with semantic paradoxes in a manner that is acceptable to a classical logician. However, in investigating a problem that was raised at the end of J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, we discover that something is missing from Leitgeb’s original definition. Moreover, we (...)
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  • The Complexity of Revision.Gian Aldo Antonelli - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (1):67-72.
    In this paper we show that the Gupta-Belnap systems S# and S* are П12. Since Kremer has independently established that they are П12-hard, this completely settles the problem of their complexity. The above-mentioned upper bound is established through a reduction to countable revision sequences that is inspired by, and makes use of a construction of McGee.
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  • Axiomatic theories of truth.Volker Halbach - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Definitional and axiomatic theories of truth -- Objects of truth -- Tarski -- Truth and set theory -- Technical preliminaries -- Comparing axiomatic theories of truth -- Disquotation -- Classical compositional truth -- Hierarchies -- Typed and type-free theories of truth -- Reasons against typing -- Axioms and rules -- Axioms for type-free truth -- Classical symmetric truth -- Kripke-Feferman -- Axiomatizing Kripke's theory in partial logic -- Grounded truth -- Alternative evaluation schemata -- Disquotation -- Classical logic -- Deflationism (...)
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  • Set-theoretic absoluteness and the revision theory of truth.Benedikt Löwe & Philip D. Welch - 2001 - Studia Logica 68 (1):21-41.
    We describe the solution of the Limit Rule Problem of Revision Theory and discuss the philosophical consequences of the fact that the truth set of Revision Theory is a complete 1/2 set.
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  • Alternative revision theories of truth.André Chapuis - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (4):399-423.
    The Revision Theory of Truth has been challenged in A. M. Yaqūb's recent book The Liar Speaks the Truth. Yaqūb suggests some non-trivial changes in the original theory - changing the limit rule - to avoid certain artifacts. In this paper it is shown that the proposed changes are not sufficient, i.e., Yaqūb's system also produces artifacts. An alternative solution is proposed and the relation between it and Yaqūb's solution is explored.
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  • The liar speaks the truth: a defense of the revision theory of truth.Aladdin Mahmūd Yaqūb - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Yaqub describes a simple conception of truth and shows that it yields a semantical theory that accommodates the whole range of our seemingly conflicting intuitions about truth. This conception takes the Tarskian biconditionals as correctly and completely defining the notion of truth. The semantical theory, which is called the revision theory, that emerges from this conception paints a metaphysical picture of truth as a property whose applicability is given by a revision process rather than by a fixed (...)
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  • Revision and its rivals.Donald A. Martin - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:407-418.
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  • The truth is never simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.
    The complexity of the set of truths of arithmetic is determined for various theories of truth deriving from Kripke and from Gupta and Herzberger.
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  • Supervaluation on Trees for Kripke’s Theory of Truth.Casper Storm Hansen - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):46-74.
    A method of supervaluation for Kripke’s theory of truth is presented. It differs from Kripke’s own method in that it employs trees; results in a compositional semantics; assigns the intuitively correct truth values to the sentences of a particularly tricky example of Gupta’s; and – it is argued – is acceptable as an explication of the correspondence theory of truth.
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  • Notes on the mathematical aspects of Kripke’s theory of truth.Melvin Fitting - 1986 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (1):75-88.
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  • Comparing fixed-point and revision theories of truth.Philip Kremer - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):363-403.
    In response to the liar’s paradox, Kripke developed the fixed-point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. Kripke’s work suggests a number of related fixed-point theories of truth for such languages. Gupta and Belnap develop their revision theory of truth in contrast to the fixed-point theories. The current paper considers three natural ways to compare the various resulting theories of truth, and establishes the resulting relationships among these theories. The point is to get a sense of the lay of (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Robert L. Martin and Peter W. Woodruff. On representing ‘true-in-L' in L. Philosophia , vol. 5 no. 3 , pp. 213–217. - Saul Kripke. Outline of a theory of truth. The journal of philosophy, vol. 72 , pp. 690–716. - Anil Gupta. Truth and paradox. Journal of philosophical logic, vol. 11 , pp. 1–60. - Hans G. Herzberger. Notes on naive semantics. Journal of philosophical logic, vol. 11 , pp. 61–102. [REVIEW]Geoffrey Hellman - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (4):1068-1071.
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  • (1 other version)The Gupta-Belnap systems ${\rm S}^\#$ and ${\rm S}^*$ are not axiomatisable.Philip Kremer - 1993 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (4):583-596.
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  • On Gupta-Belnap revision theories of truth, Kripkean fixed points, and the next stable set.P. D. Welch - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360.
    We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified account of varied revision sequences-as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.
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  • Revision.Vann McGee - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:387-406.
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  • (2 other versions)On Representing `True-in-L' in L.Geoffrey Hellman - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (4):1068-1071.
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