Over the course of its first seven editions, Principles of Biomedical Ethics has proved to be, globally, the most widely used, authored work in biomedical ethics. It is unique in being a book in bioethics used in numerous disciplines for purposes of instruction in bioethics. Its framework of moral principles is authoritative for many professional associations and biomedical institutions-for instruction in both clinical ethics and research ethics. It has been widely used in several disciplines for purposes of teaching in the (...) classroom, during conferences, etc. (shrink)

Informed consent is a central topic in contemporary biomedical ethics. Yet attempts to set defensible and feasible standards for consenting have led to persistent difficulties. In Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics Neil Manson and Onora O'Neill set debates about informed consent in medicine and research in a fresh light. They show why informed consent cannot be fully specific or fully explicit, and why more specific consent is not always ethically better. They argue that consent needs distinctive communicative transactions, by which (...) other obligations, prohibitions, and rights can be waived or set aside in controlled and specific ways. Their book offers a coherent, wide-ranging and practical account of the role of consent in biomedicine which will be valuable to readers working in a range of areas in bioethics, medicine and law. (shrink)

Too often, we as individuals do things that harm us, that seriously interfere with our being able to live in the way that we want. We eat food that makes us obese, that promotes diabetes, heart failure and other serious illness, while at the same time, we want to live long and healthy lives. Too many of us smoke cigarettes, even while acknowledging we wish we had never begun. We behave in ways that undercut our ability to reach some of (...) our most valued goals, despite education and despite incentives to choose the right thing. What should be done?If I were to try to harm someone else in a way that alters his future seriously and perhaps irrevocably for the worse, I would be stopped. When it comes to hurting myself, though, we have a common belief that it is wrong to interfere, even if I foresee that I will very much regret what I have done, often when it is too late to fix what I have let happen. I think this makes no sense. If it is permissible, even obligatory, to stop me when I do something that seriously interferes with someone else's chances of achieving the life he wants, I think …. (shrink)

Dr Baumgarten analyses three possible justifications for doctors to decide that a patient is 'incompetent' to make or participate in medical decisions affecting him, and points out the difficulties of each. He argues that the degree to which a patient relinquishes control over decision-making which affects him will vary in different circumstances and should be explicitly agreed in the initial doctor-patient contract, rather as it often is when a client employs a professional to invest money on his behalf.

Jessica Flanigan defends patients' rights of self-medication on the grounds that same moral reasons against medical paternalism in clinical contexts are also reasons against paternalistic pharmaceutical policies, including prohibitive approval processes and prescription requirements.

The principle of autonomy presupposes Patient Decision Making Competence (PDMC). For a few decades a considerable amount of empirical research has been done into PDMC. In this contribution that research is explored. After a short exposition on four qualities involved in PDMC, different approaches to assess PDMC are distinguished, namely a negative and a positive one. In the negative approach the focus is on identifying psychopathologic conditions that impair sound decision making; the positive one attempts to assess whether a patient (...) actually has the required abilities and qualities. Characteristic of the latter approach is the use of (or development of) test-like instruments for PDMC assessment. Some of these tests are discussed and commented on. Although they may be useful in investigating aspects of PDMC, none of the described approaches and tests offers a reliable and valid method for PDMC assessment. In response to a potential misuse of tests, the concept of a supportive situation is briefly introduced in order to draw attention to the risk of prematurely deeming patients incompetent on the basis of low test scores, whereas their insufficient performance may be (partly) attributable to alack of situational support. Also, the need for and possibility of an emotionalist concept of PDMC are suggested, as an alternative to the more common rationalist one. In this regard,the legitimacy of competence being conceived as a presumption or fiction of law, deserves further investigation. (shrink)

This article explores the patient consent process in modern community pharmacy practice and discusses the related ethical dilemmas in this environment. The myth of appropriately informed consent, and irrefutable evidence as to a pharmacist’s intentions when advising a patient, are core issues for discussion. The objective is to clarify where such dilemmas may exist in the consent process and to ultimately form a framework against which ethical guidelines might facilitate resolution of the dilemma faced by the pharmacist who is expected (...) to simultaneously maintain legal and duty of care responsibilities in the patient consent process. (shrink)

In light of the variety of uses of the term autonomy in recent bioethics literature, in this paper, I suggest that competence, not being as contested, is better placed to play the anti-paternalistic role currently assigned to autonomy. The demonstration of competence, I will argue, can provide individuals with robust spheres of non-interference in which they can pursue their lives in accordance with their own values. This protection from paternalism is achieved by granting individuals rights to non-interference upon demonstration of (...) competence. In this paper, I present a risk-sensitive account of competence as a means of grounding rights to non-interference. On a risk-sensitive account of competence individuals demonstrate their competence by exercising three capacities to the extent necessary to meet a threshold determined by the riskiness of the decision. These three capacities are the capacity to acquire knowledge, use instrumental rationality, and form and revise a life plan. (shrink)

Patient counseling is a cornerstone of ethical pharmacy practice and high quality pharmaceutical care. Counseling promotes patient compliance with prescription regimens and prevents dangerous drug interactions and medication errors. Counseling also promotes informed consent and protects pharmacists against legal risks. However, economic, social, and technological changes in pharmacy practice often force community pharmacists to choose between their professional obligations to counsel patients and business objectives. State and federal legislatures have enacted laws that require pharmacists to counsel patients, but these laws (...) have had mixed results. This essay argues that community pharmacy's patient counseling conundrum can be solved through additional moral education and moral persuasion, not through additional legal mandates. (shrink)

Radical changes are taking place in the United Kingdom in relation to the classification of, and access to, medicines. More and more medicines are being made available over the counter both in local pharmacies and in supermarkets. The provision of more open access to medicines may be hailed as a triumph for patient autonomy. This paper examines whether such a claim is real or illusory. It explores the ethical and legal implications of deregulating medicines. Do patients benefit? What is the (...) impact on pharmacists? Are the true beneficiaries of change largely the pharmaceutical industries? (shrink)

Most behavioral decision research takes place in carefully controlled laboratory settings, and examination of relationships between performance and specific real-world decision outcomes is rare. One prior study shows that people who perform better on hypothetical decision tasks, assessed using the Adult Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC) measure, also tend to experience better real-world decision outcomes, as reported on the Decision Outcomes Inventory (DOI). The DOI score reflects avoidance of outcomes that could result from poor decisions, ranging from serious (e.g., bankruptcy) to minor (...) (e.g., blisters from sunburn). The present analyses go beyond the initial work, which focused on the overall DOI score, by analyzing the relationships between specific decision outcomes and A-DMC performance. Most outcomes are significantly more likely among people with lower A-DMC scores, even after taking into account two variables expected to produce worse real-world decision outcomes: younger age and lower socio-economic status. We discuss the usefulness of DOI as a measure of successful real-world decision making. (shrink)

This paper argues for the importance of the political context of a society for bioethics. In particular, I argue that in a liberal constitutional society, such as the one we find ourselves in, no particular moral perspective is granted a privileged position. Rather, individuals are allowed to live their lives according to values they adopt for themselves, and the rights granted to protect this ability “trump” social consensus, and place boundaries on the social application of personal moral beliefs and values.

There is a great deal of support for the contention that the ethical cognition of health care professionals are of consequence to the level of patient care provided. The present study examines the ethical cognition of what has traditionally been deemed a profession of incomplete or marginal status: the retail, or community, pharmacy setting. An empirical examination of ethical cognition compares a systematic random sample of retail pharmacists with pharmacy students. Additional comparisons are made with a baseline of ethical cognition (...) abilities of other health care professionals, such as physicians and nurses.Based on cognitive-developmental theory and using a well-known measure of ethical reasoning, two hypotheses are explored regarding the ethical reasoning skills of retail pharmacy practitioners and pharmacy students. Results indicate that, contrary to cognitive moral development theory, students possess greater ethical reasoning skills than do their practitioner counterparts. In addition, baseline comparisons with other health professional groups reflect unfavorably on the retail pharmacists. It is suggested that the selection-socialization processes inherent in the retail pharmacy setting may result in one or more of the following outcomes: 1) the selection of lower ethical reasoners to the community pharmacy setting, 2) the exodus to other pharmacy settings of higher reasoners, and 3) a possible retrogression in the ethical cognition of community practitioners. Implications for retail practice and limitations are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt to show that the doctrine of informed consent, as practiced in the relationships between physicians and patients, often does not fulfill its main purpose, i.e., it does not safeguard the interests, rights, and dignity of patients. This happens because of clinicians' skepticism about the existence of the right to informed consent, patients' disinclination to make decisions, the current nature of health care, and the absence of clear guidelines about implementing informed consent. In the context of (...) this paper informed consent refers to the principle of respect for autonomy. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Principles of Biomedical Ethics. By Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress.

Since Mill's seminal work On Liberty, philosophers and political theorists have accepted that we should respect the decisions of individual agents when those decisions affect no one other than themselves. Indeed, to respect autonomy is often understood to be the chief way to bear witness to the intrinsic value of persons. In this book, Sarah Conly rejects the idea of autonomy as inviolable. Drawing on sources from behavioural economics and social psychology, she argues that we are so often irrational in (...) making our decisions that our autonomous choices often undercut the achievement of our own goals. Thus in many cases it would advance our goals more effectively if government were to prevent us from acting in accordance with our decisions. Her argument challenges widely held views of moral agency, democratic values and the public/private distinction, and will interest readers in ethics, political philosophy, political theory and philosophy of law. (shrink)