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Sellarsian materialism

Philosophy of Science 49 (June):212-27 (1982)

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  1. Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
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  • Sellars, scientific realism, and sensa.James W. Cornman - 1970 - Review of Metaphysics 23 (3):417-51.
    One thing that would profit both the frustrated readers of Sellars and Sellars himself would be a careful attempt to explicate and evaluate critically the many interrelated theses stated and defended by Sellars. But, so far as I know, there has been little work of this kind done. I know only of two fine reviews by Keith Lehrer and Gilbert Harman, and a very helpful expository article by Richard Bernstein that deal directly and in some detail with Sellars' work. This (...)
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  • The concept of emergence.Paul E. Meehl & Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - In Herbert Feigl & Michael Scriven (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. , Vol. pp. 239--252.
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  • (1 other version)I.Wilfrid Sellars - 1981 - The Monist 64 (1):3-36.
    1. The lever in question is, of course, that with which, provided that an appropriate fulcrum could be found, Archimedes could move the world. In the analogy I have in mind, the fulcrum is the given, by virtue of which the mind gets leverage on the world of knowledge.
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  • Phenomenalism.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - In Robert Colodny (ed.), Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview. pp. 60-105.
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  • (1 other version)Science, Sense Impressions, and Sensa.Wilfrid Sellars - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 24 (3):391-447.
    How am I to account for this difficulty? I would like to be able to say that Cornman has simply misconstrued the appearances he is seeking to save, and that his subtle hypothetical-deductive theorizing rests on faulty "observation." Yet although I do think that he has misconstrued the views he is seeking to explain, and shall argue this in detail, I have come to see that I must bear a substantial part of the responsibility. He may have missed some clues (...)
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