Board composition, insider participation on compensation committees, and director compensation practices can potentially cause conflicts of interest between directors and shareholders. If these corporate governance structures result in situations where actions beneficial to directors do not also benefit shareholders, then shareholders may suffer.Corporate ethics programs usually address conflicts of interest that may arise in the firm''s activities. Some boards of directors take active roles in their firms'' ethics programs by actively overseeing the programs. This paper empirically examines the relationship between (...) ethics programs and potential conflicts of interest and the relationship between board involvement in a firm''s ethics program and potential conflicts of interest. (shrink)

One area of business performance of particular interest to both scholars and practitioners is corporate social responsibility. The notion that organizations should be attentive to the needs of constituents other than shareholders has been investigated and vigorously debated for over two decades. This has provoked an especially rich and diverse literature investigating the relationship between business and society. As a result, researchers have urged the study of the profiles and backgrounds of corporate upper echelons in order to better understand this (...) relationship.There is ample evidence that corporations have in recent years increased the proportion of outside directors on their boards. This has been partly in reaction to increased interest in the corporate social responsiveness of business organizations and suggestions that the board of directors could play a unique role in this area. The expectation on the part of practitioners, researchers, and governmental regulators is that outside directors will advocate greater corporate responsiveness to society''s needs by playing a more active role in overseeing managerial decisions. (shrink)

In three studies, factors influencing the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting were assessed. We examined (1) the effects of personal values and (2) codes of corporate conduct, on whether managers misrepresented financial reports. In these studies, executives and controllers were asked to respond to hypothetical situations involving fraudulent financial reporting procedures. The occurrence of fraudulent reporting was found to be high; however, neither personal values, codes of conduct, nor the interaction of the two factors played a significant role in fraudulent (...) financial reporting. (shrink)