Paul Appelbaum and colleagues propose four models of informed consent to research that deploys whole genome sequencing and may generate incidental findings. They base their analysis on empirical data that suggests that research participants want to be offered incidental findings and on a normative consensus that researchers incur a duty to offer them. Their models will contribute to the heated policy debate about return of incidental findings. But in my view, they do not ask the foundational question, In the context (...) of genome sequencing, how much work can consent be asked to do? (shrink)

Researchers increasingly rely on large data sets of health information, often linked with biological specimens. In recent years, the argument has been made that obtaining informed consent for conducting records-based research is unduly burdensome and results in ?consent bias.? As a type of selection bias, consent bias is said to exist when the group giving researchers access to their data differs from the group denying access. Therefore, to promote socially beneficial research, it is argued that consent should be unnecessary. After (...) analyzing the biostatistics evidence and bioethics arguments, the article concludes that (1) claims about the amount of consent bias are overstated; (2) commonly used statistical methods usually can account for consent bias; and (3) any residual effects of consent bias are below an acceptable level of imprecision and constitute a reasonable social cost for conducting ethically responsible research. (shrink)

For nearly twenty-five years, federal regulation of privacy issues in research involving human subjects was the primary province of the federal rule for Protection of Human Subjects. As of April 14, 2003, the compliance date for the Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, however, the Common Rule and the Privacy Rule jointly regulate research privacy. Although, in theory, the Privacy Rule is intended to complement the Common Rule, there are several areas in which the rules diverge. (...) In some instances the inconsistencies result in gaps in privacy protection; in other instances the inconsistencies result in added burdens on researchers without additional privacy protections. In all instances, the lack of harmonization of these rules has created confusion, frustration, and misunderstanding by researchers, research subjects, and institutional review boards. In this article, I review the major provisions of the Privacy Rule for research, explain the areas in which the Privacy Rule and Common Rule differ, and conclude that the two rules should be revised to promote consistency and maximize privacy protections while minimizing the burdens on research. (shrink)

Biomedical research is so important that there is a positive moral obligation to pursue it and to participate in itScience is under attack. In Europe, America, and Australasia in particular, scientists are objects of suspicion and are on the defensive.i“Frankenstein science”5–8 is a phrase never far from the lips of those who take exception to some aspect of science or indeed some supposed abuse by scientists. We should not, however, forget the powerful obligation there is to undertake, support, and participate (...) in scientific research, particularly biomedical research, and the powerful moral imperative that underpins these obligations. Now it is more imperative than ever to articulate and explain these obligations and to do so is the subject and the object of this paper.Let me present the question in its starkest form: is there a moral obligation to undertake, support and even to participate in serious scientific research? If there is, does that obligation require not only that beneficial research be undertaken but also that “we”, as individuals and “we” as societies be willing to support and even participate in research where necessary?Thus far the overwhelming answer given to this question has been “no”, and research has almost universally been treated with suspicion and even hostility by the vast majority of all those concerned with the ethics and regulation of research. The so called “precautionary approach”9 sums up this attitude, requiring dangers to be considered more likely and more serious than benefits, and assuming that no sane person would or should participate in research unless they had a pressing personal reason for so doing, or unless they were motivated by a totally impersonal altruism. International agreements and protocols—for example, the Declaration of Helsinki10 and the CIOMS Guidelines11—have been directed principally at …. (shrink)

For nearly twenty-five years, federal regulation of privacy issues in research involving human subjects was the primary province of the federal rule for Protection of Human Subjects. As of April 14, 2003, the compliance date for the Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, however, the Common Rule and the Privacy Rule jointly regulate research privacy. Although, in theory, the Privacy Rule is intended to complement the Common Rule, there are several areas in which the rules diverge. (...) In some instances the inconsistencies result in gaps in privacy protection; in other instances the inconsistencies result in added burdens on researchers without additional privacy protections. In all instances, the lack of harmonization of these rules has created confusion, frustration, and misunderstanding by researchers, research subjects, and institutional review boards. In this article, I review the major provisions of the Privacy Rule for research, explain the areas in which the Privacy Rule and Common Rule differ, and conclude that the two rules should be revised to promote consistency and maximize privacy protections while minimizing the burdens on research. (shrink)

Over the past few years, a growing number of people have called for reconceptualizing participation in health research as a moral obligation. John Harris argues that seriously debilitating diseases give rise to important needs, and since medical research is necessary to relieve those needs in many circumstances, people are morally obligated to act as research subjects.1 Rosamond Rhodes claims that research participation is a moral obligation for reasons of justice, beneficence, and self-development: because we all benefit significantly from modern medicine, (...) we are all required to do our part in advancing the state of medical knowledge.2 Individuals who reap the benefits of medical knowledge without contributing .. (shrink)