Only in rational creatures is there found a likeness of God which counts as an image . . . . As far as a likeness of the divine nature is concerned, rational creatures seem somehow to attain a representation of [that] type in virtue of imitating God not only in this, that he is and lives, but especially in this, that he understands (ST Ia Q.93 a.6).

This piece challenges Michael Ruse on three points: (1) The charge that Christian myth and doctrine are incredible fails to take into account the scholarship that has clarified the genre to which myth belongs and its function. (2) Naturalistic explanations, like Ruse's, have fully as much difficulty dealing with questions of purpose and evil as religion does. (3) The concept of “deception” has a number of inherent problems that Ruse fails to consider, of which the chief is that it requires (...) a certainty about truth and falsity that Ruse cannot and does not claim to possess. (shrink)