The classic, influential essay in 'descriptive metaphysics' by the distinguished English philosopher.

The sixteen essays in this volume confront the current debate about the relationship between philosophy and its history. On the one hand intellectual historians commonly accuse philosophers of writing bad - anachronistic - history of philosophy, and on the other, philosophers have accused intellectual historians of writing bad - antiquarian - history of philosophy. The essays here address this controversy and ask what purpose the history of philosophy should serve. Part I contains more purely theoretical and methodological discussion, of such (...) questions as whether there are 'timeless' philosophical problems, whether the issues of one epoch are commensurable with those of another, and what style is appropriate to the historiography of the subject. The essays in Part II consider a number of case-histories. They present important revisionist scholarship and original contributions on topics drawn from ancient, early modern and more recent philosophy. All the essays have been specially commissioned, and the contributors include many of the leading figures in the field. The volume as a whole will be of vital interest to everyone concerned with the study of philosophy and of its history. (shrink)

Im Anschluß an die Erörterung einiger Voraussetzungen der Metaphysik Strawsons benenne ich dessen Hauptargument gegen Leibniz: Sobald wir die Rolle recht verstehen, welche die Perspective spielt, die individualisierenden Akten jeweils zugrunde liegen kann, erkennen wir sofort, daß Leibniz Strawsons Theorie der Individualisierung dadurch untergraben könnte, daß er jene Pramissen attackiert. Den Spieß drehe ich dann um und zeige, daß nicht nur Strawsons Einwand gegen Leibniz' Konzeption von Individualität untauglich bleibt, vielmehr die eigene Theorie auch keine adäquate Antwort auf eine Modifikation (...) des Schachbrett-Beispiels liefern kann, das er gegen Leibniz einsetzt. Dies führt am Ende zu der Einsicht, daß Strawsons Wendung gegen Leibniz wie manche Verteidigung von Leibniz gegen Strawson Leibniz' Prinzip der Identität des Ununterscheidbaren unangemessen in einer Weise interpretiert, die Strawson viel zu viel dialektischen Spielraum beläßt. (shrink)

Two recent articles described two ways of writing the history of philosophy, one analytic, the other historical, as if the history of philosophy cannot be both analytically sharp and contextually informed at the same time. I recommend the practice of "philosophical history of philosophy," which combines the advantages of the analytic and historical methods.

Can original philosophy be done while simultaneously engaging in the history of philosophy? Such a possibility is questioned by analytic philosophers who contend that history contaminates good philosophy, and by historians of philosophy who insist that theoretical predecessors cannot be ignored. Believing that both camps are misguided, the contributors to this book present a case for historical philosophy as a valuable enterprise. The contributors include: Todd L. Adams, Lilli Alanen, Jos? Bernardete, Jonathan Bennett, John I. Biro, Phillip Cummins, Georges Dicker, (...) Daniel A. Dombrowski, Daniel Garber, Josiah Gould, Jorge J.E. Gracie, Daniel Graham, Charles Griswold, James Lawler, Rudolf Luthe, Edward H. Madden, George Mavrodes, Gerald E. Myers, Jonathan R?e, Frithjof Rodi, Kenneth L. Schmitz, Vladimir Shtinov, David G. Stern, Robert Turnbull, James Van Cleve, Frederick Van De Pitte, Henry Beatch, and Richard Watson. (shrink)

Philosophy as a separate discipline is a rather new phenomenon. This presents problems for our understanding of what constitutes the history of philosophy. Past writers often approached their concerns from a multi-disciplinary perspective; thus to understand them we have to do more than answer a contemporary set of issues. To that end, I suggest we attend to Locke's advice on how to read a text. Following this advice may permit us to avoid several puzzles which result from misreading a text.