Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.

Many of the leading contributors to the field of environmental ethics demonstrate a preference for foundationalist approaches in their theoretical justifications of environmentalism. In this paper, I criticise this tendency as it figures in the work of Holmes Rolston III, J. Baird Callicott, and Eric Katz. I illustrate how these writers' desire for philosophical absolutes leads them to reject the moral resources present within human culture; a move that carries with it a number of troubling philosophical and political problems. I (...) conclude that environmental theorists would be better served by taking a more contextual, social, and pragmatic approach to justifying their moral projects regarding nature, and that this mode of inquiry will ultimately lead toward a more philosophically sound and democratically authentic environmental ethics. (shrink)

The expression ‘cultural pluralism’ was popularized by Horace Kallen, a student of William James. I explore the meaning of pluralism in the context of the American pragmatic tradition with emphasis on the meaning of pluralism for William James. Kallen sought to characterize cultural pluralism in contrast with the idea of America as a ‘melting-pot’. I also examine the contributions of Randolph Bourne and the African-American philosopher Alain Locke to the discussion of cultural pluralism. I conclude by indicating that the idea (...) of a democratic society that respects and is enriched by differences is highly relevant to contemporary discussions of cultural pluralism in a global context. (shrink)

In recent years, scholars studying the writing of the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey have attempted to use his ethical ideas to construct a viable environmental ethics. This endeavor has found limited success and generated some intriguing debates, but has been found wanting in many areas important to environmental ethicists of the twenty-first century. In particular, the humanist motivations behind many of his ethical writings stand in the way of a philosophy that takes nonhumans seriously. However, there is much environmental (...) philosophers can learn from Dewey, not from his ethics, but from his ontological writings. A concept of the contingency of existence, found in Dewey, in particular in Experience and Nature, can be the foundation for a robust, if dark, ecological philosophy. (shrink)

Fallibilist pluralism is a moral and epistemological position that preserves both broadly conceived ethical pluralisms and the possibility of searching for a shared moral vision. In this essay Katariina Holma defends fallibilist pluralism as an important epistemological contribution to today's theories on citizenship education and analyzes the educational difficulties of adopting fallibilist pluralism as a conceptual framework in which citizens would encounter different others. Holma argues that to be successful, theories on citizenship education require—in addition to a justified philosophical foundation—a (...) more profound psychological understanding of the role emotions play in human morality and moral development. Holma also analyzes two philosophical biases that tend to obscure our understanding of the central role played by emotional dispositions on encountering difference. (shrink)

The field of environmental ethics hosts a debate between competing strategies of practical reason. Both sides of the debate share a commitment for ethics to address environmental problems, but strategies diverge over notions of what an ethic must accomplish in order to do so effectively. Should ethics critique the cultural worldviews that give rise to environmental problems and propose alternative environmental values, or should it develop practical responses to problems from broadly available cultural values? That initial question of strategy seems (...) to force a practical dilemma: choosing (what I will call) a cosmological strategy allows one to critique the depth of problems, but at the cost of distance from the .. (shrink)

Andrew Light and Eric Katz commend environmental pragmatism as a framework of choice for a more pluralistic, and (consequently) more practically effective environmental ethics. There is however a prima facie conflict between the promotion of pluralism and the promotion of pragmatism. I consider two different routes by which Light has attempted to resolve this conflict. Light’s first strategy involves distinguishing philosophical from metaphilosophical forms of pragmatism, locating its “metatheoretically pluralist” potential in the latter. I argue that the distinction collapses, leaving (...) the conflict unresolved. Light’s second strategy involves interpreting metatheoretical pluralism as a form of practical compatibilism. I argue that metatheoretical pluralism, thus interpreted, holds no remedy for the perceived practical ineffectiveness of the field. Not only would it fail to qualify as a viable form of pluralism, but its widespread adoption would actively undermine the real work of environmental ethics: that of fostering a senseof the special significance of enlightened and principled action in defense of environmentalist ideals, in the face of the consequentialism which dominates global environmental decision making. (shrink)

Despite Christopher Stone’s recent argument on behalf of moral pluralism, the principal architects of environmental ethics remain committed to moral monism. Moral pluralism fails to specify what to do when two or more of its theories indicate inconsistent practical imperatives. More deeply, ethical theories are embedded in moral philosophies and moral pluralism requires us to shift between mutually inconsistent metaphysics of morals, most of which are no Ionger tenable in light of postmodern science. A univocal moral philosophy-traceable to David Hume’s (...) and Adam Smith’s theory of moral sentiments, grounded in evolutionary biology by Charles Darwin, and latterly extended to the environment by Aldo Leopold-provides a unified, scientifically supported world view and portrait of human nature in whichmultiple, lexically ordered ethics are generated by multiple human, “mixed,” and “biotic” community memberships. (shrink)

Contemporary pragmatists frequently claim to be pluralists, but infrequently say what this commitment means. The authors argue that pragmatism is inconsistent with any commitment that can plausibly be called pluralism.

Scientific realism is a critical target of anti-representationalists such as Richard Rorty and Huw Price, who have questioned the very possibility of providing a satisfactory argument for realism or any other ontological position. I will argue that there is a viable form of realism which not only withstands this criticism but is vindicated on the antirepresentationalists’ own grounds. This realist position, largely drawn from the notion of the scientific method developed by the founder of philosophical pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce, will (...) further be compared with the accounts of truth and objectivity proposed by the contemporary pragmatists, Rorty, Price, and Robert B. Brandom. (shrink)

Moral reasoning typically informs environmental decision-making by measuring the possible outcomes of policies or actions in light of a preferred ethical theory. This method is subject to many problems. Environmental pragmatism tries to overcome them, but it suffers also from some pitfalls. This paper proposes a new method of environmental pragmatism that avoids the problems of both the traditional method of environmental moral reasoning and of the general versions of environmental pragmatism. We call it ‘justificatory moral pluralism’ – it develops (...) the intuition that normative ethical theories need not be mutually exclusive. This leaves room for important forms of pluralist environmental ethics that do not require a once-and-for-all prior commitment to an ethical theory when deciding about policies or courses of action related to the protection of the environment. Justificatory moral pluralism offers a viable solution to the recurrent conflicts between efficient environmental decisions and the need for moral reasoning. (shrink)

A growing number of contributors to environmental philosophy are beginning to rethink the field’s mission and practice. Noting that the emphasis of protracted conceptual battles over axiology may not get us very far in solving environmental problems, many environmental ethicists have begun to advocate a more pragmatic, pluralistic, and policy-based approach in philosophical discussions abouthuman-nature relationships. In this paper, we argue for the legitimacy of this approach, stressing that public deliberation and debate over alternative environmental ethics is necessary for a (...) culture of democracy to be upheld in decision making and policy formulation. Then we argue for a democratically tempered environmental ethics that is grounded in a practical understanding of the character of moral claims regarding the natural world. We offer the results of an empirical study of environmental ethics held by the public to illustrate the diversity in their moral commitments to nature. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of this ethical pluralism for policy discussions about the management of American public lands. (shrink)

Anthony Weston has criticized the place of “inttinsic value” in the development of an environmental ethic, and he has urged a “pragmatic shift” toward a plurality of values based on human desires and experiences. I argue that Weston is mistaken for two reasons: (1) his view of the methodology of environmental ethics is distorted: the intrinsic value of natural entities is not the ground of all moral obligations regarding the environment; and (2) his pragmatic theory of value is too anthropocentric (...) and subjective for the development of a secure and reliable environmental ethic. The obligation to protect the natural environment should not be based on certain “correct” experiences of humans as they interact with wild nature. (shrink)

Environmental pragmatism is routinely characterised as an environmental philosophy that rejects the traditional values questions within environmental ethics. Critics of environmental pragmatism, in turn, complain that it cannot be characterised as an environmental philosophy, since it evades precisely the philosophical issues with which environmental philosophers are supposed to engage. This essay works to defend environmental pragmatism against the charge that it necessarily evades the central questions of environmental ethics. I argue that environmental pragmatism need not reject foundational questions regarding values (...) and nature; however, I contend that the meaningfulness of such questions to a pragmatist depends firstly on reframing them in terms of a valuing relation, and secondly on a turn to the insights of moral psychology. (shrink)

Methodological pragmatists argue that, given the dire state of the environment, the primary goal of environmentalists, including philosophers who work in environmental ethics, must be to work together to ensure that environmentally friendly policies are put into place. They must set aside their differences and not argue over their competing theoretical justifications of environmental policies, as that contributes to divisiveness among environmentalists and prevents this cooperation from occurring. The proposal to ignore disagreements over theory gets cashed out in three distinct (...) ways, however, and consequently one can identify three distinct versions of methodological pragmatism. Radical methodological pragmatists propose that environmentalists give up on the task of providing well-founded theoretical justifications for environmentally friendly policies and stop engaging in debates over these justifications; rather, they should focus on providing reasons for these policies that connect with whatever values people already have. Moderate methodological pragmatists propose that although there is nothing problematic in offering theoretical justifications in contexts where environmental philosophers disagree on what policy should be adopted, they should work together and put aside their theoretical differences where policy recommendations coincide. Finally, weak methodological pragmatists hold only that environmental philosophers should work together where their policies coincide and there are no additional practical or moral considerations that might be relevant to their ability to work together. The first two positions involve interesting claims, but they are fundamentally flawed. On the other hand, the third is unobjectionable but largely trivial. Thus, there is no reason to think that method­ological pragmatism can contribute to the resolution of problems in environmental ethics. (shrink)

In the past thirty years environmental ethics has emerged as one of the most vibrant and exciting areas of applied philosophy. Several journals and hundreds of books testify to its growing importance inside and outside philosophical circles. But with all of this scholarly output, it is arguably the case that environmental ethics is not living up to its promise of providing a philosophical contribution to the resolution of environmental problems. This article surveys the current state of the field and offers (...) an alternative path for the future development of environmental ethics toward a more publicly engaged model of applied philosophy. (shrink)

In this essay I propose an environmental ethic in the pragmatic vein. I begin by suggesting that the contemporary debate in environmental ethics is forced into a familiar but highly restrictive set of distinctions and problems by the traditional notion of intrinsic value, particularly by its demands that intrinsic values be self-sufficient, abstract, and justified in special ways. I criticize this notion and develop an alternativewhich stresses the interdependent structure of values, a structure which at once roots them deeply in (...) our selves and at the same time opens them to critical challenge and change. Finally, I apply this alternative view back to environmental ethics. It becomes easy to justify respect for other life forms and concern for the natural environment, and indeed many of the standard arguments only become stronger, once the demand to establish intrinsic values is removed. (shrink)

Bryan Norton advocates using the perspectives and methods of American pragmatism in environmental philosophy. J. Baird Callicott criticizes Norton’s view as unproductive anti-philosophy. I find worth and deficiencies in both sides. On the one hand, I support the pragmatic approach, illustrating its use in an argument for sustainable agriculture. On the other hand, I take issue with Norton’s claim that pragmatists should confine themselves to anthrpocentric arguments. Here I agree with Callicott’s inclusion of nonanthropocentric consideration. However, I reject Callicott’s moral (...) monism. In sum, I support pragmatic moral pluralism that includes nonanthropocentric values. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom suggests that environmental pragmatists balk at the mere mention of intrinsic value. Indeed, the leading expositor of the pragmatic position in environmental philosophy, Bryan Norton, has delivered withering criticisms of the concept as it has been employed by nonanthropocentrists in the field. Nevertheless, I believe that Norton has left an opening for a recognition of intrinsic value in his arguments, albeit a version that bears little resemblance to most of its traditional incarnations. Drawing from John Dewey’s contextual approach (...) toward moral inquiry, I offer a reconstructed notion of intrinsic value that avoids the metaphysical pitfalls identified by Norton. I argue that this contextual understanding of noninstrumental claims has the advantage of turning our attention toward, and not away from, the critical realm of practice and policy, and that it is especially compatible with the norms of democratic deliberation. By way of example and in defense of my position, I conclude with a rejoinder to Holmes Rolston’s claims about the role of foundational intrinsic value commitments in settling the human-nature dilemma at Royal Chitwan National Park in Nepal. (shrink)

A growing number of contributors to environmental philosophy are beginning to rethink the field’s mission and practice. Noting that the emphasis of protracted conceptual battles over axiology may not get us very far in solving environmental problems, many environmental ethicists have begun to advocate a more pragmatic, pluralistic, and policy-based approach in philosophical discussions abouthuman-nature relationships. In this paper, we argue for the legitimacy of this approach, stressing that public deliberation and debate over alternative environmental ethics is necessary for a (...) culture of democracy to be upheld in decision making and policy formulation. Then we argue for a democratically tempered environmental ethics that is grounded in a practical understanding of the character of moral claims regarding the natural world. We offer the results of an empirical study of environmental ethics held by the public to illustrate the diversity in their moral commitments to nature. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of this ethical pluralism for policy discussions about the management of American public lands. (shrink)

For much of its brief history, the field of environmental ethics has been critical of anthropocentrism. I here undertake a pragmatic reconsideration of anthropocentrism. In the first part of this essay, I explain what a pragmatic reconsideration of anthropocentrism means. I differentiate two distinct pragmatic strategies, one substantive and one methodological, and I adopt methodological pragmatism as my guiding principle. In the second part of this essay, I examine a case study of environmental policy—the problem of beach replenishment on Fire (...) Island, New York—as a pragmatic test of anthropocentrism. I conclude that the debate between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism needs to be expressed in non-absolutist terms, i.e., in a language that permits compromise, flexibility, and a pluralism of values. Thechoice between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism as the basis of both environmental policy and environmental ethics is highly contextual and thus requires a subtle examination of the concrete policy situation. (shrink)

The article examines five controversial views, expressed in Jonathan Swift’s _A Modest Proposal_, Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer’s _Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants_, Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva’s “After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?”, Julian Savulescu’s “Procreative beneficence: why we should select the best children”, and the author’s “A rational cure for prereproductive stress syndrome”. These views have similarities and differences on five levels: the grievances they raise, the proposals they make, the justifications they explicitly (...) use, the justifications they implicitly rely on, and the criticisms that they have encountered. A comparison of these similarities and differences produces two findings. First, some controversial views based on utilitarian considerations would probably fare better flipped upside down and presented as Juvenalian satires. Secondly, a modicum of humor or modesty could help presenters of controversial views to stir polite critical discussion on the themes that they put forward. (shrink)

Why is democracy good, or preferable to other systems of governance and political decision-making? Democracy has been argued to incorporate or promote central values, such as equality or freedom. On the other hand, many contemporary defenses of democracy have relied on arguments that attempt to show that democracy promotes or enables some second-order good, such as the validity, justification or legitimacy of political decision-making. Recent decades have seen the rise of epistemic arguments for democracy that belong to this latter type. (...) For example, David Estlund has proposed that democracy is epistemically preferable among the societal arrangements that could be acceptable to all citizens. In turn... (shrink)

Environmental pragmatists have presented environmental pragmatism as a new philosophical position, arguing that theoretical debates in environmental philosophy are hindering the ability of the environmental movement to forge agreement on basic policy imperatives. Hence, they aim to lead environmental philosophers away from such theoretical debates, and toward more practical—and pragmatically motivated—ones. However, a position with such an aim is not a proper philosophical position at all, given that philosophy (among other things) is an effort to get clear on the problems (...) that puzzle us. (shrink)

John Rawls argued that democracy must be justifiable to all citizens; otherwise, a democratic society is oppressive to some. In A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy (), Robert B. Talisse attempts to meet the Rawlsian challenge by drawing from Charles S. Peirce's pragmatism. This article first briefly canvasses the argument of Talisse's book and then criticizes its key premise concerning (normative) reasons for belief by offering a competing reading of Peirce's “The Fixation of Belief” (). It then proceeds to argue that (...) Talisse's argument faces a dilemma: his proposal of epistemic perfectionism either is substantive and can be reasonably disagreed about or is minimal but insufficient to ground a democratic society. Consequently, it suggests that the Rawlsian challenge can only be solved by abandoning Rawls's own notion of reasonableness, and that an interesting alternative notion of reasons can be derived from Peirce's “Fixation.”. (shrink)

There has been a recent spate of publications on how we should evaluate change to ecological systems, some of which have introduced the concept of 'relational values'. Environmental ethicists have, with a few exceptions, not engaged with this debate. We survey the literature on relational values, noting that most advocates of the concept introduce relational values as an additional type of value, in addition to 'instrumental' and 'intrinsic' values. In this paper, we explore the idea that all environmental values are (...) ultimately relational. We explore how such an approach can be articulated, and discuss the implications of this concept for the future of environmental ethics and value studies. One key implication is to suggest a stronger role for empirical ethnography. (shrink)

Environmental pragmatists such as Bryan Norton and Ben Minteer argue that environmental philosophers should look to the values of real people and communities to determine which environmental policies and legislation should be put into place. But they want to avoid a kind of simplistic relativism, since that view entails all sorts of reprehensible conclusions about what is right and wrong and what is valuable, both generally and with respect to the environment. Their solution is to distinguish between the community’s surface (...) or apparent values and its true values—the community’s true values serve as the basis for the moral appraisal and justification of policies and legislation, and they believe that these will neither endorse nor justify reprehensible principles or policies. The community’s true values, according to Norton, are those that survive a critical, deliberative process. However, there is no reason to think that the process described by Norton will yield normatively better values—values that do not have reprehensible implications. Even if the process described by Norton were to have this effect, he cannot consistently appeal to it, since it runs counter to his overall account of value as being nothing more than actual instances of real people caring about and valuing something. If value is a function of what people actually value here and now, then what people would value under conditions that are unlikely to occur is irrelevant to what is valuable and what can count as the true values of a community. Thus, Norton’s view, and environmental pragmatism, at least to the extent that Norton’s account is representative of that view, remains susceptible to the reprehensible implications problem. (shrink)

Pragmatism gained considerable attention in bioethical discussions in the early 21st century. However, some dimensions and contributions of pragmatism to bioethics remain underexplored in both research and practice. It is argued that pragmatism can make a distinctive contribution to bioethics through its concept, developed by Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey, that ethical issues can be resolved through experimental inquiry. Dewey’s proposal that policies can be confirmed or disconfirmed through experimentation is developed by comparing it to the confirmation of scientific (...) hypotheses, with a focus on the objection that the consequences of following a moral view or policy do not provide guidance on choosing among competing ethical perspectives. As confirmation of scientific hypotheses typically relies on evidence gathered from observation, the possibility of ethically relevant observation is then explored based on Peirce’s views on feelings as emotional interpretants. Finally, the connection between Dewey’s experimental ethics and democracy is outlined and compared to unfettered ethical progressivism. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Toward Unity among Environmentalists. By Bryan G. Norton.

It is argued that the emergence of controversial views in discussions of theoretical medicine and bioethics is best explained by the assumption of moral realism within those discursive practices. Neither of the main alternatives of realism in contemporary meta-ethics — moral expressivism and anti-realism — can account for the rise of controversies in the bioethical debate. This argument draws from the contemporary expressivist or anti-representationalist pragmatism as advanced by Richard Rorty and Huw Price, as well as the pragmatist scientific realism (...) and fallibilism of the founder of pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce. In accordance with the fallibilist view, it is proposed that presenting controversial positions may serve epistemic purposes within bioethical debates, providing opportunities for inquiry by pointing towards problems to be solved and arguments and evidence for and against to be put forward. (shrink)