This article examines Aristotle's model of deliberation as inquiry (zêtêsis), arguing that Aristotle does not treat the presumption of open alternatives as a precondition for rational deliberation. Deliberation aims to uncover acts that are up to us and conducive to our ends; it essentially consists in causal mapping. Unlike the comparative model presupposed in the literature on deliberation, Aristotle's model can account for the virtuous agent's deliberation, as well as deliberation with a view to “satisficing” desires and deliberation that fails (...) to uncover any expedient course of action. Aristotle's account of the constraints governing rational deliberation is furthermore not incompatibilist—for all Aristotle says, we may deliberate rationally despite being committed to the truth of determinism. (shrink)

Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most interesting intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She explains what it was, how the Stoics justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, moral character, fatalism, logical determinism and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideas retain today.

Selon les Stoïciens, à l'issue d'une longue période de temps l'univers entier s'embrase. Tout disparaît alors, sauf le feu divin lui-même. L'univers renaît ensuite à l'identique. Ce processus se répète à l'infini, d'où, l'expression « retour éternel ». Mais comment certains événements peuvent-ils en précéder d'autres, s'ils doivent se répéter après eux? Et comment le même individu peut-il renaître, si sa substance est détruite? La première difficulté était probablement résolue par l'interruption du temps entre deux périodes de l'univers, et la (...) discussion de la seconde inséparable d'un critère de l'identité qui ne tienne ni à la substance corporelle ni à des détails physiques inessentiels. According to the Stoics, at the end of a long period of time, the whole universe turns into fire. It completely disappears, with the exception of divine fire itself. Then, the universe is reborn under its previous form. This process repeats itself indefinitely. This doctrine of « everlasting recurrence » encountered two difficulties : how could some events be prior to other ones, if they reproduce themselves after those posterior events? And how could the same individual reappear, if his very substance had been destroyed? The answer to the first question was presumably an interruption of time between two periods. The answer to the second was inseparable from a criterion of identity distinct from continuity of material substance and from unessential bodily characteristics. (shrink)

Where does the notion of free will come from? How and when did it develop, and what did that development involve? In Michael Frede's radically new account of the history of this idea, the notion of a free will emerged from powerful assumptions about the relation between divine providence, correctness of individual choice, and self-enslavement due to incorrect choice. Anchoring his discussion in Stoicism, Frede begins with Aristotle--who, he argues, had no notion of a free will--and ends with Augustine. Frede (...) shows that Augustine, far from originating the idea, derived most of his thinking about it from the Stoicism developed by Epictetus. (shrink)