Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Rarity, pseudodiagnosticity and Bayesian reasoning.Simon Venn, Jonathan Evans & Aidan Feeney - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (3):209-230.
    Three experiments investigated the effect of rarity on people's selection and interpretation of data in a variant of the pseudodiagnosticity task. For familiar (Experiment 1) but not for arbitrary (Experiment 3) materials, participants were more likely to select evidence so as to complete a likelihood ratio when the initial evidence they received was a single likelihood concerning a rare feature. This rarity effect with familiar materials was replicated in Experiment 2 where it was shown that participants were relatively insensitive to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Features of similarity.Amos Tversky - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (4):327-352.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   611 citations  
  • Natural myside bias is independent of cognitive ability.Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 13 (3):225 – 247.
    Natural myside bias is the tendency to evaluate propositions from within one's own perspective when given no instructions or cues (such as within-participants conditions) to avoid doing so. We defined the participant's perspective as their previously existing status on four variables: their sex, whether they smoked, their alcohol consumption, and the strength of their religious beliefs. Participants then evaluated a contentious but ultimately factual proposition relevant to each of these demographic factors. Myside bias is defined between-participants as the mean difference (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • On the failure of cognitive ability to predict myside and one-sided thinking biases.Richard F. West & Keith E. Stanovich - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):129-167.
    Two critical thinking skills—the tendency to avoid myside bias and to avoid one-sided thinking—were examined in three different experiments involving over 1200 participants and across two different paradigms. Robust indications of myside bias were observed in all three experiments. Participants gave higher evaluations to arguments that supported their opinions than those that refuted their prior positions. Likewise, substantial one-side bias was observed—participants were more likely to prefer a one-sided to a balanced argument. There was substantial variation in both types of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations